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The matatu paratransit network has been an integral part of Nairobi, Kenya’s urban fabric 
for decades, providing an accessible transportation option to the vast majority of its residents 
(Salon & Aligula, 2012a). However, because of a growing desire to tame the city’s congestion 
and improve overall transportation options, the devolution and decentralization of the Kenyan 
Government through the new 2010 Constitution, and the availability of funding from a series of 
international players, a new emphasis on transportation planning efforts which feature designs 
and plans for the implementation of a Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) system has emerged (Onyango & 
Agong, 2018). Although some pieces of the new Nairobi BRT system have been implemented, it 
still remains unclear what political processes and institutional structures influenced the 
development of the transportation plans for this system, and to what extent this planning process 
considered Nairobi’s current transportation system and habits, which are heavily reliant on the 
matatu paratransit network.   
In Nairobi, BRT has been advertised as an extraordinary low-cost solution that will not 
only resolve the cities congestion issues, but help it gain more global capital and economic 
development opportunities. This is not unique, but is actually part of a broader trend where BRT 
has become the preferred transit mode for international development organizations. However, as 
is evident by the study of Nairobi’s transportation planning efforts concerning the 
implementation of BRT, these systems are not without their own issues, and they may not be the 
best solution. As BRT continues to be touted as catch all transportation solution for cities with 
large paratransit networks throughout the world, transportation planners and policy makers 
would benefit from a deeper understanding of what has been happening concerning the planned 
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 Planning for Nairobi’s Transportation Future 
1.1: A Global Solution for a Localized Problem 
The matatu paratransit network has been an integral part of Nairobi, Kenya’s urban fabric 
for decades, providing an accessible transportation option to the vast majority of its residents 
(Salon & Aligula, 2012a). However, because of a growing desire to tame the city’s congestion 
and improve overall transportation options, the devolution and decentralization of the Kenyan 
Government through the new 2010 Constitution, and the availability of funding from a series of 
international players, a new emphasis on transportation planning efforts which feature designs 
and plans for the implementation of a Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) system has emerged (Onyango & 
Agong, 2018).  
Within the World Bank’s 2012 Kenya: National Urban Transport Improvement Project, 
BRT is one of the key infrastructural solutions proposed for Nairobi. BRT is described as being a 
low-cost mass rapid transit system which can help to transform the city of Nairobi in the same 
way it has transformed cities from the United States of America, Latin America, and Europe 
(The World Bank, 2012a). Recently, BRT has become a model solution to mitigate traffic 
congestion, efficiency and air quality concerns which the World Bank and national governments 
have been recommending to cities across the globe (Spooner & Manga, 2019). However, as the 
World Bank emphasizes, the successful implementation of BRT requires “strong political 
commitment to deal with deep vested interests linked to the provision of conventional, inefficient 
transport services” (The World Bank, 2012a p. 9).  
As of December 26, 2018, the World Bank’s 2012 Kenya: National Urban Transport 
Improvement Project has been halted for proposed project restructuring following a request from 
the Government of Kenya (GoK), as well as World Bank ratings of Moderately Satisfactory for 
progress towards achievement of the Project Development Objectives, and Moderately 
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Unsatisfactory concerning implementation progress. The proposed restructuring was finalized 
three days before the project funding was scheduled to have been completely dispersed, at which 
point only $62.01 million USD, approximately 21% of the overall project funds, had been 
distributed. Among other things, the proposed project restructuring is slated to include expanded 
plans for BRT in Nairobi (The World Bank, 2018).  
Although some pieces of the new Nairobi BRT system were implemented prior to this 
project restructuring, it still remains unclear what political processes and institutional structures 
influenced the development of the plans for that system, and to what extent this planning process 
considered Nairobi’s current transportation system and habits, which are heavily reliant on the 
matatu paratransit network.  As BRT continues to be touted as catch all transportation solution 
for cities with large paratransit networks throughout the world, transportation planners and 
policy makers would benefit from a deeper understanding of what has been happening 
concerning the planned future BRT system in Nairobi.  
 
1.2: Research Design 
This research study was designed to answer two interrelated, but separate, research 
questions: 
(1) In the case of Nairobi, Kenya, how did the political process and institutional structure 
governing the formation of existing transportation planning efforts have an influence 
on the plans themselves?  
(2) What effect did the existing transportation system, reliant heavily on the matatu 
paratransit network, have on the results of these planning efforts and their 
recommendations concerning Nairobi’s transportation future?  
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To uncover the complex realities governing Nairobi’s present and future planned 
transportation systems, a two-tiered methodology incorporating both spatial and qualitative 
approaches was employed. This mixed-method approach utilized a spatial analysis of present and 
planned future transportation network conditions, a series of interviews with key stakeholders, 
and a detailed qualitative analysis of transportation related planning and governance documents.  
The intent of the network routing spatial analysis was to provide a full picture of who is 
served by Nairobi’s existing and planned future transit system, and how well this service is being 
provided. Although this type of spatial understanding is critical, it would not be sufficient to 
answering the study’s research questions. Therefore, the qualitative analysis was designed to 
provide the a more comprehensive understanding of the policy, governance, and institutional 
structures which oversaw the development of the relevant planning documents and system 
designs, how the planning processes themselves were implemented, and how these independent 
factors transformed the existing and future planned transit systems. 
 
1.3: Introduction to Paratransit in Sub-Saharan Africa 
Cities of Sub-Saharan Africa have experienced unprecedented and rapid growth in the 
recent past, resulting in densification and sprawl which has put an increased demand on many 
urban resources including transportation systems. Increased costs and longer commutes have 
caused access to the urban cores of many of the area’s largest cities to be stifled as the majority 
of people rely on inadequate publicly accessible transportation systems (Bruun et al., 2016; Diaz 
Olvera et al., 2013). Even in spite of this growing need for publicly accessible and shared forms 
of transportation, governmental transportation planning efforts have largely failed to adequately 
meet the needs of residents (Diaz Olvera et al., 2013).  
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In response to this demand, a variety of small-scale private transportation operators 
entered the public transportation market; working together to form paratransit1 systems which 
provide service to areas whose needs are not being met by the more formalized or governmental 
transportation systems (Cervero & Golub, 2007). Paratransit systems account for the largest 
modal share within transportation systems across Sub-Saharan Africa (Behrens et al., 2016a). 
With relatively low costs, fewer logistical requirements, and a better understanding of their 
customers’ needs, these systems are able to provide a quick response to changing markets and 
growing demands. Although paratransit systems have had great success in allowing those 
without vehicles the ability to access the goods and services that they need on a daily basis, they 
have not come without faults (Cervero & Golub, 2007).  
Although they are often referred to as informal, paratransit systems generally operate 
within formalized business structures and under the oversight of government regulations 
(Behrens et al., 2016a). However, these regulations are often weak or go unenforced resulting in 
aggressive behavior which undermines the viability and legitimacy of all operators, and causes 
traffic congestion and vehicular crashes in the quest for more customers and higher profits. The 
negative effects of the absence of accountability and enforceable standards are increased 
exponentially in cities such as Nairobi with high unemployment rates (Cervero & Golub, 2007). 
                                                 
1 The most inclusive definition of the word paratransit refers to demand-response passenger transportation systems, 
like Nairobi’s matatu network, whose operations fall somewhere in between private travel and fixed-route public 
transportation systems. These types of systems are common throughout African cities and have many names in the 
urban planning industry. Literature has shown the terms “popular transport,” “informal transit,” and “mini-buses” 
are all used among scholars in the field. Although the use of the term informal transit is perhaps most common, for 
the purposes of this paper the matatu network in Nairobi, and other systems like it, will be referred to as paratransit 
due to the fact that these systems, by nature are not in fact informal. Instead, they operate under formalized 
governmental structures and regulations and their informalities rise instead out of the relationship between state 
actors and these privately owned and operated systems (Behrens et al., 2016a). 
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Both licensed and unlicensed paratransit vehicles operate together in many cities, with 
citywide paratransit fleet sizes usually in the thousands, but varying widely from city to city 
depending on the vehicle types, population, physical extent of the city, and availability of other 
transportation modes. Paratransit businesses are always privately owned. This privatization does 
not change even when the owners are government officials operating paratransit businesses on 
the side. Vehicle maintenance and daily operations are usually taken care of by the owners, 
drivers, or hired third parties (McCormick et al., 2016).   
 
 
1.4: Location and Context 
 
Figure 1-A: Nairobi context map including key residential and destination areas utilized and referenced throughout 
the course of this study 
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Kenya is situated on the east coast of the African continent. It is bordered by Somalia, 
Ethiopia, and South Sudan to the north; Uganda to the west; and Tanzania to the south. Nairobi, 
a sprawling city covering approximately 697 square kilometers, is the capital of Kenya (see 
Figure 1-A). Nairobi is already the largest city in Kenya, and it continues to grow significantly. 
In fact, the Nairobi Metropolitan Area (NMA), which had an estimated population of 3.2 million 
in 1999, is expected to reach 9 million by 2030 (Bruun et al., 2016).  
This type of rapid growth is not unique to Nairobi’s present, as the city has a rich history 
as a city of rural to urban migration (Charton-Bigot & Rodriguez-Torres, 2010). Although 
Nairobi was founded as a small railway camp in 1899, it had grown to a significant and 
substantial town by the end of the first quarter of the twentieth century. In 1919, Nairobi’s first 
town council (later called Nairobi City Council) was incorporated. However, as a colonial 
municipality, this council was filled with British and Indian representatives, as well as colonial 
officials, and governed by a European mayor (Achola, 2001). 
Within the original council there was no representation from the local African people, 
even though they made up the largest sector of the population, outnumbering Europeans nearly 
seven to one. Things changed slowly with an advisory council made up of all local African 
members being formed in 1926. However, this organization was still governed by a colonial 
official and did not have any real power. In 1945 local African representation was finally 
included on the official town council (Achola, 2001). The council has historically had a 
significant impact on many of the area’s urban and planning related affairs, including the 
transportation system (Khayesi et al., 2015).  
Nairobi is not only Kenya’s capital, but also its administrative, cultural, economic and 
trade center; surrounded by productive agricultural lands specializing in coffee, tea and cattle, as 
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well as a large industrial area focused on manufacturing (Lagasse, 2018). The working 
population is composed of approximately 1.8 million people and most formal jobs are situated 
within and around the Central Business District (CBD). However, a significant portion of 
Nairobi’s workers do not work in formal jobs, instead working within the city’s vibrant and 
diverse informal sector, including the matatu industry (Bruun et al., 2016).  
 
1.5: The Rise of Nairobi’s Matatus 
Kenya has a rich history of public transportation, with the fixed-route Kenya Bus 
Services (KBS) company having been in operation throughout the country since 1932. The KBS 
was controlled by the colonial Nairobi City Council prior to true representation from the African 
people. As the Nairobi City Council owned 25% of the KBS it was in its vested interest to allow 
the company to retain its transportation monopoly, and thus when the unsanctioned matatu 
paratransit system began operating in the 1960s they were seen as illegal and faced significant 
harassment from the KBS and local authorities (Khayesi et al., 2015).  
However, by the 1970s KBS began to lose their monopoly of the transit market, with 
several other formalized and large-scale transit businesses entering and exiting the Nairobi 
transportation market over the following two decades until there was a total collapse of the 
transit system in 1992. This opening in the market allowed for matatus to quickly rise in 
popularity (Klopp & Mitullah, 2016). Presently, about 70% of Nairobi’s daily commuters travel 
on the matatu paratransit network of mini-buses, which has become a thriving industry that 
provides employment opportunities to many people (Salon & Aligula, 2012b). 
These privately owned and operated mini-buses or vans generally seat 14 to 25 people. 
They run routes all over the city, with 99% of residents saying that matatus are accessible to 
them according to a 2004 travel survey (Salon & Aligula, 2012b). Although no exact data is 
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available, Nairobi has an estimated 9,500 matatus with 55% of the fleet being made up of 14 or 
15 passenger vans, and the remaining 45% being composed of 25-39 passenger mini-buses and 
40+ passenger full-size buses (McCormick et al., 2016). Additionally, there are a growing 
number of motorcycle taxis and three-wheeled vehicles also operating throughout Nairobi within 
for hire passenger transport models (Spooner & Manga, 2019). 
An entirely private system, Nairobi’s matatu network is composed of individuals, 
partnerships, small to large companies, and transportation management cooperative (SACCOs) 
that own vehicles and act as franchisers (McCormick et al., 2016). This level of individual and 
private operation made it easy for the network of matatus to respond to growing demand 
following the collapse of the bus system, as more matatu drivers entered the industry to fill the 
gap and provide access and mobility options to residents across Nairobi. In the absence of 
formalized transportation planning for the matatu system, the government has left it up to the 
matatu sector to develop routes, stops, fares and other system features. Ultimately, the drivers 
have acted as transportation planners and designed a system in response to demand (J. Klopp & 
Mitullah, 2016). They also contribute to Nairobi’s unique culture, with drivers embellishing their 
vehicles with art, lighting, video, and music systems in order to attract customers (Spooner & 
Manga, 2019). 
 
1.6: Governance and Rationalization of Transportation Systems 
Matatus are integral to the mobility of Nairobi residents as they have the potential to 
nimbly respond to transportation demands and increase residents’ mobility in areas where 
formalized transit systems are lacking (Salon & Aligula, 2012b; Cervero & Golub, 2007). 
However, matatus have also been known to have many issues including safety concerns, 
environmental issues, dangerous driving patterns, poor working conditions, and corrupt business 
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structures (Salon & Aligula, 2012b). Thus, the system is often associated with increased traffic 
congestion, air and noise pollution, and vehicular crashes (Cervero & Golub, 2007).  
Many of these systematic issues are affiliated with a lack of standardization across the 
system’s routes and vehicles; especially concerning the payment arrangements. Drivers are often 
incentivized to overcrowd their vans and drive dangerously in order to meet the targeted daily 
financial goals set by the van owners, and avoid being responsible for remuneration. 
Additionally, the entirely cash-based business models ignore operating costs like vehicle 
maintenance, leading to mechanical issues which interfere with the safety, performance, and 
reliability of the network as a whole (Behrens et al., 2017).  
Issues such as these could likely be solved through a formalized mechanism of oversight 
to govern and plan the network, but it can be very challenging to implement policy-based 
solutions which are dependent upon the rationalization of paratransit systems. There are many 
challenges to the rationalization of transit systems. These challenges stem not only from 
bureaucratic inactivity and institutional fragmentation, but also from the diversity of positive and 
negative effects which any alterations to paratransit systems can cause to reverberate throughout 
the cities in which they operate. However, small-scale monitoring and the enforcement of certain 
standards has shown to be successful in other cities with large paratransit systems (Cervero & 
Golub, 2007). 
As established by the 2010 Kenyan Constitution, much of Kenya’s governance is now 
facilitated at the county level. This was a stark contrast to the previous Kenyan government 
which was highly centralized in a way which “put political and economic power in the hands of a 
few, resulting in a spatially uneven and unfair distribution of resources and corresponding 
inequities in access to social services: the opposite of an inclusive state” (The World Bank, 2012 
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p. V). As Kenya is a diverse country with more than thirty ethnic minority groups, the goal of 
implementing a devolved government through the 2010 Constitution was to allow for the 
diversity of local needs to be addressed (The World Bank, 2012b).  
As an urban area, the benefits sought by the decentralization of the Kenya government 
are not necessarily seen in Nairobi. Within the decentralization process of the Kenyan 
government, management of urban infrastructure and systems previously controlled by local 
authorities was passed onto county administrations. Without a traditional city board, Nairobi is 
managed by a board of officials who are appointed by the county executives as opposed to being 
elected by the general public. The functions of this board are controlled by the county 
government and so there is no guarantee that certain urban services or needs will be funded. The 
resulting situation is one where it is challenging to hold the board accountable for the adequate 
delivery of urban services (The World Bank, 2012, p. 172).  
Nairobi is also governed by a county assembly, which may make laws it deems are 
necessary for the county government to perform its functions and powers effectively (Mbondenyi 
& Ambani, 2012). Members of the county assembly are elected (Republic of Kenya, 2010). 
Additionally, the county assembly is also the unit of government most capable of holding public 
officials at the county level accountable. However, even with the oversight of the county 
assembly, this type of devolved government has the potential to result in “failing urban service 
delivery, which would hurt residents and businesses, and so compromise the county’s growth 
prospects” (The World Bank, 2012, p. 172). 
A year following the new constitution, the Urban Areas and Cities Act of 2011 classified 
Nairobi as a “city-county.” This means that it is governed as a county would be, and does not 
have a city board (Onyango & Agong, 2018). The laws and policies governing the matatu 
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network were implemented through the Integrated National Transport Policy of 2012 and are 
fragmented across the jurisdictions of several governmental entities. The regulation and licensing 
of matatus is under the control of the Transport Licensing Board and the Traffic Act, Cap 403, 
while the enforcement of these policy and regulatory items is given to the police from the 
Nairobi City Council and the National Ministry of Transport (MoT) and Transport Licensing 
Board (McCormick et al., 2016).  
 
1.7: A Desire for Better Transportation Options 
These overarching governance issues and the matatu network’s varying levels of 
efficiency, have caused many Nairobi residents desire alternative modes of transportation. Like 
most African cities, Nairobi is growing and urbanizing rapidly. With this growth has come an 
increase in car ownership as more residents enter the middle class. Similar to many other places, 
car ownership is associated with success and wealth in Nairobi, and many people aspire to drive 
as a symbol of their financial well-being. However, car ownership in Nairobi remains 
economically and spatially segregated, with 59% of residents living at over five times the 
poverty level owning cars compared to only 2% of those under the poverty level (Salon & 
Aligula, 2012b). 
Nairobi’s roadways have not been able to handle the increase in vehicular miles traveled 
across the city, making traffic congestion, air quality, road safety, and declining mobility options 
for those in the lower economic classes a large issue. However, because of the city’s stark 
economic disparity, a successful solution for these complex transportation related problems 
would need to involve a joint strategy which includes an integrated multi-modal solution for 
people across the economic spectrum. Public opinion supports a solution where the government 
plays a more direct and significant role in the city’s transport system (Salon & Aligula, 2012b).  
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Throughout Sub-Saharan Africa the answer to these types of problems has often been 
BRT systems, something which has been included in several of Nairobi’s transportation plans. 
BRT is a bus-based public transportation network which utilizes the implementation of a 
segregated right-of-way, rapid and frequent operations, and branding strategies to emulate the 
benefits of a railway network at a fraction of the cost (Gauthier & Weinstock, 2010). BRT 
systems have the ability to play a significant role as a piece of a multi-modal urban transportation 
system as it retains the flexibility of fixed-route bus services while carrying passenger loads 
more akin to rail services. Additionally, BRT systems operate with low upfront and capital costs, 
have short implementation times, and can significantly decrease pollution and greenhouse gas 
emissions (Munoz & Paget-Seekins, 2016).  
Generally, successful implementation of BRT has been centered on a phased 
implementation model with the intention of eventually completely replacing paratransit systems 
by incorporating them into the BRT operating companies (Schalekamp et al., 2016). 
Additionally, successful implementation has generally required significant institutional capacity 
and a strong political commitment to evaluate and propose compromising solutions which work 
with existing transportation providers, like those employed within Nairobi’s matatu industry, less 
resistant to the project (The World Bank, 2012a).  
 
1.8: Context within Related Scholarship 
The Significance of Paratransit 
According to Behrens et al. (2016) the emergence of scholarly articles discussing paratransit 
first began in the 1980s and 1990s, but were primarily focused on Southeast Asian cities. 
Behrens et al. (2016) add to this with an overview of the current state and history of paratransit 
in the cities of the Sub-Saharan African region. Bruun et al. (2016) get even more geographically 
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specific by discussing an overview of paratransit and how it functions across the cities of Cape 
Town, South Africa; Dar es Salaam, Tanzania; and Nairobi, Kenya. This research presents 
information concerning the populations the systems serve and the spatial scale at which the 
systems operate, as well as pertinent information concerning the economic situation. This type of 
research concerning the inner workings and history of paratransit systems, especially in Sub-
Saharan Africa and Nairobi, helps lay the groundwork for understanding the matatu network and 
its impact on the city today.  
Some of the literature on paratransit also focuses specifically on operations, policy, and 
governance of these types of paratransit transportation systems. McCormick et al. (2016) discuss 
the systems of operation which govern paratransit in many African cities, ultimately focusing on 
Nairobi in particular and reviewing details of the matatu system’s operations, governance, and 
policy in formation. Klopp and Mitullah (2016) focus on the way in which Nairobi’s matatu 
network has filled the gap in transportation needs left in the absence of a more formalized transit 
network. Although all of these authors summarize a significant amount of knowledge 
surrounding paratransit systems’ development, business structure, governance, and regulations, 
insufficient literature has been found showcasing the role that these networks play in the 
development of future municipal transportation plans, which is the goal of this paper. 
 
Neoliberalism & The Political Economy of Transportation 
There are a significant number of scholarly articles focusing on theories of urban planning 
which are relevant to this study, especially those concerning the reorganization and significant 
alteration of transportation systems as a form of power exerted through neoliberalism. Dovey 
(1999) describes placemaking as a fundamentally elite practice. Although this does not mean the 
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built environment is oppressive by nature, it does enforce the idea that urban environments are 
designed and constructed in a way that reflects the interests of the society’s elite members. 
According to Brenner & Theodore (2005), neoliberalism in the urban context is dependent 
upon the active deployment of state power in which the relationship between the state 
governance and the economy is mobilized in order to promote market-based regulations and 
policies. Concerning transportation specifically, Rizzo (2017) sees neoliberalism’s influence on 
transportation systems in African cities within two separate phases. The first phase was a roll 
back of the state’s power over transportation throughout the 1990s -- corresponding with the 
dismantling of Nairobi’s former bus system. The second phase, in which Nairobi finds itself 
now, consists of a series of large-scale state initiatives to reinvent transportation systems in order 
to promote the interests and ideals of private capital.  
According to Baeten (2012), the neoliberal transformation of urban planning in itself implies 
a reworking of state and market relationships in which “the state does not simply ‘lose power’ 
but gains a more proactive role in the introduction of market principles in planning through 
local, national and international regulatory reforms” (p. 207). Within this new urban 
framework, residents of a city can no longer rely on government players to meet their needs as 
“the city as right, as entitlement, is slowly being replaced with the city as possibility and 
opportunity” (p. 207).  
Dovey (1999) goes on to define power exerted through urban planning in neoliberal capitalist 
society in two distinct, yet related, categories. The first is ‘power to,’ which describes the way in 
which states’ exert power in order to influence citizens’ behavior through urban planning and the 
design of the built environment. The second, ‘power over,’ describes instead the way in which 
states’ can control people more directly through oppression or force. Although power exerted as 
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‘power over’ is often perceived as a more obvious threat, power exerted as ‘power to’ often 
yields a more significant, if subtle, impact on the everyday lives of people within an urban 
context.  
Another prevailing theme within the literature is that of BRT as a neoliberal project. Gauthier 
and Weinstock’s (2010) agree that “a well-functioning public transport system (BRT), in which 
citizens are fully mobile, is the first step towards allowing African cities to realize their true 
economic potential” (p. 326). According to Paget-Seekins (2015) the dominant models for BRT 
systems create a “market for bus service from large private companies where the government 
takes on the risk and brands the service as part of the city's attempt to be a ‘world class’ city that 
can attract mobile capital” (p. 1).  
This idea of exerting the power of urban and transportation planning as a byproduct of 
globalization was also a theme throughout the literature. Cervero and Golub (2007) elaborate on 
how the relationship between a lack of wealth and the prominence of paratransit systems has 
motivated public authorities to invest in attempts to erase them in order to convey to the broader 
world a “modern, first-world image” (p. 446). Along these same lines, other authors speak to the 
way in which many African planners have pursued goals of transforming into a “global city” by 
capitalizing on the city’s potential to become a place of elite global consumption as opposed to a 
place where its residents are able to obtain a high quality of life (Carmody & Owusu, 2016). This 
contradiction points to Harvey’s (2008) definition of the right to the city as a “a collective rather 
than an individual right since changing the city inevitably depends upon the exercise of a 
collective power over the processes of urbanization” (p. 1). Harvey (2008) argues that a people’s 
right to alter their city for their themselves is a human right which is both incredibly precious and 





A review of the literature also showcased an overall need for more research concerning 
governance structures and planning practices affecting and controlling transportation planning 
efforts in Nairobi, Kenya specifically. Although research has been conducted on various pieces 
of this topic, the current literature lacks the holistic approach which this paper provides. 
Concerning relevant federal governance matters, Onyango and Agong (2018) discuss Kenya’s 
2010 constitutional decentralization of governmental services as being “among the most rapid 
and ambitious devolution processes going on in the world, with new governance challenges and 
opportunities as the country builds a new set of county governments from scratch” (p. 1). At the 
same time, they point to how Nairobi was classified within the Urban Areas and Cities Act of 
2011 as a “city-county,” which is intended to be governed in the same fashion as a county. 
On the topic of public participation within relevant governmental planning and policy 
initiatives in Kenya, Mbithi et al. (2018) define public participation as having the goals of 
informing, engaging, consulting, collaborating with, and empowering the people. However, 
throughout Kenya the accepted system of public engagement relies heavily on the 
implementation of standard one-way communication platforms, like public hearings, which do 
not support meaningful public participation. 
 
Studying and Understanding Accessibility 
 Overcoming a lack of data is a significant barrier to research and urban planning efforts 
concerning paratransit systems across the world. Diaz Olvera et al. (2013) discuss the ways in 
which planners and decision-makers in the cities of Sub-Saharan Africa are still not 
implementing initiatives which would allow them to better understand the daily travel behaviors 
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of the people in their cities. This deeper understanding would help generate solutions to many 
transportation issues, like congestion, pollution, and vehicular crashes (Diaz Olvera et al., 2013). 
In an attempt to collect the data to aid this understanding, Williams et al. (2015) discuss the use 
of cell phones to collect and develop a shared open source data system for Nairobi’s matatu 
network. The collection and sharing of this data has allowed for increased efficiency and use of 
the matatu system while also demonstrating the and need for datasets on paratransit systems in 
general. There is an overall lack of data-based research on the transportation systems in place in 
Nairobi which this paper provides through the employment of a network analysis.  
Literature surrounding transportation and infrastructure planning in Nairobi focuses heavily 
on financial and technical issues, looking less closely at types of human accessibility issues 
which this paper focuses on. Chirisa et al (2016) begin an analysis of Nairobi’s challenges to 
expanding its infrastructural systems, including transportation, with a discussion of Nairobi’s 
rapid growth. From there, they move on to discuss the challenges which Nairobi has in 
maintaining its roadways, as well as associated economic and financing issues related to 
financing urban infrastructure projects. Financial problems are tied to a lack of available public 
funding due to both insufficient monetary supplies and a misuse of funds that were available to 
relevant authorities (Mbithi et al., 2018).  
Cevero and Golub (2007) speak about the way in which paratransit is viewed by officials and 
government entities as being a problem which must be dealt with. Although they understand the 
origins of such an attitude, they also state that paratransit systems provide a multitude of benefits 
and that banning them without consideration is not in the greater public interest. Rizzo (2018) 
focuses more specifically on the plans for Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) stating that BRT 
implementation within African countries is a tool of neoliberalism to disrupt the existing 
18 
 
transportation market in order to create an opportunity for banks, construction companies, and 





 Developing a Spatial Understanding 
Geographic Information Systems (GIS) methods were used to answer spatial questions 
surrounding the accessibility and design of Nairobi’s present and future planned transit systems 
including the existing pedestrian network, the existing matatu network, and the planned future 
BRT network. For the purposes of this spatial analysis, vehicular network connectivity was not 
examined as access to private vehicles not widely available across the economic spectrum in 
Nairobi (Salon & Aligula, 2012b). However, this uneven access to private vehicles was 
considered when evaluating the results of the spatial analysis by income as well as within the 
qualitative aspects of the study.  
The spatial analysis employed first required the construction and preparation of several, 
new spatial datasets created with data that was collected, cleaned, and/or digitized from a variety 
of untraditional resources (see Section 2.1). Three separate citywide transit networks were 
created: Network 1: Existing Transit Network (Existing Matatu + Existing Pedestrian Networks), 
Network 2: Uncoordinated Planned Future (Planned BRT + Existing Pedestrian Networks), and 
Network 3: Coordinated Planned Future (Planned BRT + Existing Matatu + Existing Pedestrian 
Networks) (see Section 2.2). A sample series of 981 origin points categorized by income, and 
449 destination points categorized by destination type, were also created for use within the 
analyses (see Section 2.3).  
A multifaceted comparative analysis of accessibility and mobility throughout Nairobi was 
then executed. Pedestrian access to existing matatu stops and planned BRT stations from 
residential neighborhoods across income groups was assessed and compared during the stop and 
station accessibility analysis (see Section 2.4). The potential coordination between the two 
systems was measured by analyzing the pedestrian transfer access in between the planned BRT 
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stations and the existing matatu stops during the system coordination analysis (see Section 2.5). 
Transit access via residential neighborhoods to various destinations was compared across the 
three transit networks during the triple network analysis (see Section 2.6).  
 
2.1: Datasets 
Land Use Characteristics 
For the spatial analysis, land use data for the City of Nairobi was collected from a dataset 
developed by the Global Water Operators’ Partnership Alliance (GWOPA) in partnership with 
the French Institute for Research in Africa (IFRA) for the Geo Reference Utility Benchmarking 
System (GRUBS) City level project for the City of Nairobi (see Figure 2-A). This dataset was 
developed through the use of remotely sensed data, and is built on the assumption that Nairobi 
neighborhoods with similar physical attributes also have similar socio-economic characteristics. 
The remotely sensed data was grouped and categorized by the observable physical attributes of 
each area including the proportion of built space, tree-cover, and roofing typologies, and areas 
were sorted into a variety of land uses. Finally, socio-economic data was collected from a 




Figure 2-A: Land use data for Nairobi published by the GRUBS-city level project (Ledant, 2011) 
 
Existing Matatu Network 
For the existing matatu network, data was collected from the Digital Matatu’s Project 
(see Figure 2-B). This data was collected from 135 matatu routes originally in 2012 and 2013. 
The data collection process was led by the University of Nairobi in partnership with the Digital 
Matatu’s team. This process involved the identification of existing routes followed by the use of 
mobile GPS-enabled tools on-board matatus to collect the route path and information. This data 
was distributed in both General Transit Feed Specification (GTFS) and shapefile formats 




Figure 2-B: Nairobi Matatu Routes Map2 published by the Digital Matatus Project (Digital Matatus, 2017; Klopp et 
al., 2015) 
Average speeds for the matatu network by corridor were collected from the Institute for 
Transportation and Development Policy (ITDP) (see Figure 2-C). Matatu speeds and passenger 
                                                 
2  Following the production of this map by the Digital Matatus team it was adopted by the Nairobi city government 
as the official matatu map in January, 2014. Prior to this, there was no official government supported map of the 
matatu routes with an open data platform (Williams et al., 2015). 
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surveys were collected on key corridors. 
Speeds were slowest within the Central 
Business District (CBD) and got 
proportionally faster the further they were 
from the CBD (ITDP & UN Habitat, 2015). 
As this data was not available digitally for the 
purposes on this research, the information 
was digitized by hand with the use of GIS 
software. It is important to understand that as 
this data was collected during a survey it embodies a point-in-time and does not represent time-
based changes which likely impact speeds. 
The data collected from ITDP did not contain all matatu corridors included within the 
Digital Matatus data, and so speeds on missing segments of corridor were extrapolated from the 
ITDP speed data based on the segments distance from the CBD. All matatu corridors with 
missing data within one kilometer of the CBD were given the approximate average speed of 
seven and a half kilometers per hour; all matatu corridors with missing data in-between one and 
five kilometers from the CBD were given the approximate average speed of 12.5 kilometers per 
hour; and all matatu corridors with missing data over 10 kilometers from the CBD were given 
the approximate average speed of 17.5 kilometers per hour. 
 
Pedestrian Street Network 
The data for the pedestrian street network in Nairobi was downloaded from 
OpenStreetMap (OSM) utilizing the Python package OSMnx (Boeing, 2017). This data was built 
by an open community of mappers who have added information based on their own knowledge 
Figure 2-C: Average matatu speed data across surveyed 
corridors provided within the ITDP Nairobi Ndovu/A104 
BRT Service Plan (ITDP & UN Habitat, 2015) 
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of the place (OpenStreetMap Contributors, 2018). All streets within the administrative boundary, 
no matter the type or inclusion of pedestrian infrastructure, were included as part of the 
pedestrian network. This decision was based on field observations as well as interviews which 
affirmed that pedestrians in Nairobi utilize and occupy all roadways (see Figure 2-D). Walking 
speeds across the pedestrian network were universally estimated at three kilometers per hour.  
 
Figure 2-D: Pedestrian street network acquired from OpenStreetMaps3  
 
Planned Bus Rapid Transit System 
Digital data was not able to be acquired for the future planned BRT system. Therefore, 
the BRT system data was digitized based on the design from the Mass Rapid Transit System 
                                                 
3 Although this was the most comprehensive street network dataset available for Nairobi, the included data was 




(MRTS) Harmonization Study by the German based consulting firm, Gauff Consultants, which 
was prepared for the GoK and the MoT, and financed by the African Development Bank Group 
(AfDB) (see Figure 2-E). This plan includes a two-phase design with both BRT lines and 
upgrades to a light rail transit system, but only the planned BRT lines for Phase I were digitized 
for this study. Phase I includes five BRT lines which were intended to be implemented from 
2018 to 2030 (Gauff Consultants, 2014).  
 
Figure 2-E: Nairobi Proposed MRTS / Commuter Rail Network from the 2014 Mass Rapid Transit System (MRTS) 
Harmonization Study which was digitized for purposes of this study4 (Gauff Consultants, 2014) 
 
                                                 
4 The stylistic choices seen in the Nairobi Proposed MRTS / Commuter Rail Network map mimic the choices 
developed by the Digital Matatus Project for the Nairobi Matatu Routes Map (see Figure 2-B) developed prior to 
this map. This reflects a desire to potentially present a unified system.   
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Speed estimates for the BRT system were based on typical commercial speeds presented 
in the Traffic Safety on Bus Priority Systems: Recommendations for integrating safety into the 
planning, design, and operation of major bus routes study published by the WRI Ross Center for 
Sustainable Cities in 2015. This study gives several different commercial speed predictions for a 
variety of mass rapid transit systems’ based on their operating typology. For the purposes of this 
study, the speed predictions for a BRT system operating on suburban arterial roadways with 
predominately express service was deemed most appropriate based on the proposed BRT system 
design5. This put the estimated BRT speeds for the Nairobi system in between 28 and 35 
kilometers per hour, with lower speeds given to corridor segments closer to the CBD, and higher 
speeds given to corridor segments further from the CBD (Dudata et al., 2015). 
 
2.2: Transit Network Creation 
Utilizing the datasets collected, four networks were created with the use of Esri ArcMap 
GIS software (see Figure 2-F). Networks 1 through 3 were utilized throughout the study and 
included in the triple network analysis (see Section 2.6), whereas Network 4 was utilized in the 
stop and station accessibility analysis as well as the system coordination analysis (see Sections 
2.4 and 2.5).  These finalized networks which were created and employed throughout this study 
include:  
                                                 
5 It is important to recognize that this speed condition was chosen based on the optimal design of the BRT system 
following the analysis of planning documents, and that it is based on the assumption that the BRT routes will run 
predominately within uninterrupted express lanes on which non-MRTS vehicles are not permitted. If these optimal 
conditions are not achieved, it should be assumed that the BRT speeds will drop drastically especially within close 
proximity of the CBD.  
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• Network 1 - Existing Transit Network: 
this network was developed in order to 
analyze the existing transit conditions in 
Nairobi. Therefore, it includes only the 
existing matatu network and the existing 
pedestrian network.  
• Network 2 - Uncoordinated Planned 
Future: this network was created to analyze 
any Nairobi’s future transit network including 
the BRT system designed the Mass Rapid 
Transit System (MRTS) Harmonization Study 
without any potential transfers from the 
existing matatu system. Therefore, it includes 
only the planned future BRT network and the 
existing pedestrian network. 
• Network 3 - Coordinated Planned Future: 
was created to analyze a comprehensive 
transit network that includes the existing 
pedestrian network, the existing matatu 
network, and the planned future BRT network.  
• Network 4 – Pedestrian Network: this 
network includes only the existing pedestrian 
network (see Figure 2-D). 
Figure 2-F: Comparison across transit networks  
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2.3: Development of Origin and Destination 
Points 
To understand accessibility from 
origins in residential neighborhoods where the 
people of Nairobi live, to destinations in key 
areas where they may potentially work, a 
series of origin and destination points were 
created. The establishment of these points 
allows for this transportation focused analysis 
to begin to assess and understand the impacts 
of Nairobi’s land use patterns on its transit 
network through the inclusion of origin and 
destination points from a variety of different 
land uses across the city. However, more 
research on the precise impact of land use planning on Nairobi’s transit system would be 
required before any firm conclusions could be drawn.  
To create the needed origin and destination points, a grid of points evenly spaced 250 
meters apart was developed. This spacing represented approximately a five-minute walk at the 
study’s walking speed of three kilometers per hour. These points were then snapped to the 
previously created pedestrian street network, and any points not within 250 meters of a 
pedestrian street were deleted (see Figure 2-G). This process resulted in a total of 8,680 points 
across the City of Nairobi at a density of approximately 12.5 points per square kilometer. 
Next, points were grouped based on their spatial locations within either origin 
(residential) or destination areas. Origin points in residential areas were categorized as low 




income if average incomes were under approximately 6,153 KES per month, middle income if 
average incomes were between approximately 13,352 KES and 22,083 KES per month, or high 
income if average incomes were over approximately 39,890 KES per month.  
Concerning the potential destinations, three categories were created: CBD, secondary 
destinations, and tertiary destinations. The CBD category included points within the City of 
Nairobi’s CBD. The secondary destinations category included points within land uses classified 
as agricultural lands, airports, industrial areas, or quarries. The tertiary destinations category 
included points within land uses classified as dump sites, farms, graveyards, parks6, public 
spaces, and recreation areas. All points not within an origin or destination category were deleted, 
leaving a total of 981 origin point and 449 destination points (see Figure 2-H). 
 
Figure 2-H: Final origin and destination points utilized for this study  
                                                 
6 This category includes all parks except for the Nairobi National Park which was removed because of its size.  
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2.4: Stop and Station Accessibility Analysis 
Pedestrian accessibility to existing 
matatu stops and planned BRT stations from 
all 981 residential origins points was analyzed 
and compared across incomes. Accessibility to 
each system was measured within a distance 
of 0.5 kilometers (approximately a 10-minute 
walk), 1 kilometer (approximately a 20-minute 
walk), and 1.5 kilometers (approximately a 
33-minute walk)7  (see Figure 2-I).  
 
Existing Matatu Stop Accessibility 
At all distances low-income residents 
have the least access to matatu stops in 
Nairobi and middle-income residents have the 
best access (see Figure 2-J). At 0.5 kilometers 
58% of middle-income residential origin 
                                                 
7 Half of a kilometer is an internationally recognized distance to which transit is considered accessible. However, 
normal walking distances in Nairobi are higher, with over 20% of walking trips being over five kilometers as people 
are forced to get to their destinations by any means possible (Rahul & Verma, 2014; Salon & Aligula, 2012). People 
are more willing to walk when they do not have a car and otherwise have no other options (Rahul & Verma, 2014). 
Although this does not make these higher distances truly acceptable, it does warrant their inclusion within this 
analysis as something that must be considered and understood when thinking about the daily transportation choices 
which Nairobi residents make. 
Percent of Residential Origin Points with 







0.5 KM 48% 58% 54% 
1 KM 67% 83% 72% 
1.5 KM 75% 94% 87% 
Figure 2-I: Matatu stop and BRT station accessibility via 
the pedestrian network analysis methodology 











points have access to at least one matatu stop 
compared to 54% of high-income origin points 
and 48% of low-income origin points.  
Concerning the number of matatu 
stops which a residential point has access to, 
low-income resident have the most access 
Figure 2-L: Matatu stop accessibility via the 
pedestrian network from residential origin points 
based on income and distance from the CBD. 
Figure 2-K: Matatu stop accessibility by location 
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closer to the CBD whereas high- and middle-
income residents in neighborhoods over 10 
kilometers from the CBD tend to have better 
access in term of the number of matatu stops 
they can reach than their low-income counter 
parts (see Figures 2-K and 2-L).  
 
Planned BRT Station Accessibility 
Pedestrian access to the 32 planned 
BRT stations is not ample from residential 
points no matter their income. At a distance of 
0.5 kilometers only 2% of residential origin 
points at any income level can walk to a BRT 
station. At a distance of 1 kilometer this 
increases to 7% for low-income, 8% for 
middle-income and 6% for high-income. At 
1.5 kilometers, low-income has the most 
access at 17%, but this distance is very far so 
this access is still poor (see Figures 2-M and 
2-N).  
Percent of Residential Origin Points with 







0.5 KM 2% 2% 2% 
1 KM 7% 8% 6% 
1.5 KM 17% 15% 11% 




Figure 2-M:  BRT station accessibility by location 
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2.5: System Coordination Analysis 
In order to understand the potential for 
coordination and easy transfers between the 
existing matatu system and the planned BRT 
system, a system coordination analysis was 
conducted. This analysis quantified both the 
number of matatu stops and the number of 
matatu routes which are accessible by the 
pedestrian network from the locations of the 
planned BRT stations. Pedestrian walking 
distances of approximately 150 meters 
(approximately a three-minute walk), 250 
meters (approximately a five-minute walk) 
and 500 meters or 0.5 kilometers 
(approximately a ten-minute walk) were 
assessed along the pedestrian network. The 
distances for this analysis were much shorter 
than those utilized in the Stop and Station 
Accessibility analysis as acceptable distances 
to walk while transferring between modes 
during a single trip are much shorter than 
those for accessing a transit system from a 
trip’s point of origin. Aside from utilizing the 




for origins, and the smaller distances to better assess transfer potential, this methodology was the 
same as performed for the stop and station accessibility analysis (see Figure 2-I).  
Just measuring access to the matatu system from a BRT station is not enough though, it is 
also important to assess access to a variety of matatu routes. Overall, it was found that the average 
planned BRT station is within 150 meters from three matatu stops which serviced on average 
five matatu lines, 250 meters of four matatu stops which serviced on average eight matatu lines, 
and within 500 meters of eight matatu stops which serviced on average 13 matatu lines. The 
level of accessibility of matatu stops from the planned BRT stations varies widely across the five 
planned BRT lines. Although Line 3 – Chui, which runs east-west across the City from Njiru to 
Show Ground, has the best access to matatu lines within 150 meters with an average of nearly 
seven matatu lines accessible, Line 4 – Kifaru, which runs from Mama Lucy to the east through 
the CBD to Blue Sky/T-Mall to the south, has the best access within 250 meters with an average 
of nearly 12 matatu lines accessible, as well as within 500 meters with an average of 
approximately 16 routes accessible. Line 1 – Ndovu, which begins to the west at Kangeni and 
travels southeast through the CBD to Imara, has the worst transfer access across all metrics with 
only two matatu stations and five matatu routes accessible within 150 meters, only three matatu 
stops and seven matatu routes within 250 meters, and only four matatu stops and 10 matatu 
routes within 500 meters (see Figure 2-O). 
Potential transfer access from the planned BRT stations to the existing matatu routes was 
also measured specifically within the CBD. Seven BRT stations are planned for the CBD area: 
Central Station, Globe Cinema Station, Kenyatta Av Station, Lanhies Rd Station, Moi Av 
Station, Selassie Av Station, and University Station. On average, transfer access across all of the 
planned BRT stations within the CBD was found to be higher than the overall system. These 
stations were found to have two matatu stations and six matatu routes accessible within 150 
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meters, six matatu stops and 12 matatu routes within 250 meters, and 14 matatu stops and 
twenty-two matatu routes within 500 meters. 
The last item assessed within the system was the potential transfer access between the 
existing matatu and planned BRT systems for hub BRT stations. For the purposes of this 
analysis, a hub BRT station is one that hosts more than one BRT line. This means that riders can 
transfer within the BRT system at these hub stations. Twelve stations were identified as hubs: 
Kenyatta Av Station, Selassie Av Station, Makabururini Station, Nyayo Station, University 
Station, Balozi Station, Landhies Rd Station, Koriobanji Roundabout Station, Blue Sky/T-Mall 
Station, Nairobi Hospital Station, Donholm Caltex Station, and Imara Station.  
Four of these stations are found within the CBD. On average, transfer access across all of 
the hub BRT stations was found to be higher than the overall system, but lower than the averages 
of only stations within the CBD. These stations were found to have three matatu stations and 
seven matatu routes accessible within 150 meters, five matatu stops and 10 matatu routes within 
250 meters, and eight matatu stops and 15 matatu routes within 500 meters. 
 
2.6: Triple Network Analysis 
The purpose of the triple network analysis was to understand who in Nairobi is served by 
the existing and planned transit systems, and how well. This portion of the spatial analysis 
included three separate, but identical, network routing analyses for each of the three multi-modal 
networks previously developed (see Section 2.2). The networks analyzed include Network 1: 
Existing Transit Network (Existing Matatu + Existing Pedestrian Networks), Network 2: 
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Uncoordinated Planned Future (Planned BRT 
+ Existing Pedestrian Networks), and Network 
3: Coordinated Planned Future (Planned BRT 
+ Existing Matatu + Existing Pedestrian 
Networks). 
A separate routing analysis utilizing 
the study’s network of residential origin and 
key destination points (Section 2.3) was 
conducted for Network 1, Network 2, and 
Network 3. The network routing analyses 
were performed to assess how far a person 
could get utilizing each network in a span of 
30-, 60-, or 90-minutes of travel. For all 981 
residential origin points, 30-, 60- and 90-minute service areas were developed. Then, the number 
of destination points from the CBD, Secondary Destinations, and Tertiary Destinations which 
were within each service area were quantified (see Figure 2-P).  By comparing the results of 
these analyses in conjunction with relevant land use and demographic data, a foundational 
understanding of who each of these three multi-modal networks serve, and how well it serves 
them, was gained.  
 
Transit Access by Network and Income to the Central Business District 
Access to the CBD is challenging for all income levels in Nairobi, with only 2% of all 
surveyed residential origin points able to reach the CBD in 30-minutes regardless of income. The 
implementation of the BRT system does little to improve 30-minute access to the CBD for low-




income residents whether assessed alone (as in 
Network 2) or in conjunction with the existing 
matatu system (as in Network 3), with access 
remaining at 2% across all networks. However, 
the implementation of the BRT makes a small 
difference in 30-minute access to the CBD for 
both middle- and high-income residents (see 
Figures 2-Q and 2-R).  
A larger impact was seen as a result of 
the implementation of the planned BRT system 
when looking at 60-minute access to the CBD 
across networks and incomes. Middle-income 
residents, have the highest level of 60-minute 
access to the CBD across networks with 32% 
access when utilizing Network 1, 37% access utilizing Network 2, and 38% access utilizing 
Network 3. High-income residents had 60-minute access levels to the CBD ranging from 5% to 
7% lower than their middle-income counter parts with approximately 27% access utilizing 
Network 1, which grows to 31% utilizing Networks 2 and 3. Low-income residents have the 
lowest levels of access to the CBD within 60-minutes, with approximately 23% access utilizing 
Network 1, compared to 27% utilizing Networks 2 and 3 (see Figures 2-Q and 2-S). 
Figure 2-Q: Access to the CBD by income and network 
38 
 
Ninety-minute access to the CBD from 
surveyed residential origin points follows 
similar patterns to 60-minute access. Middle-
income residents are still found to have the 
highest access to the CBD across the three 
networks, but the addition of the planned BRT 
system has less of an impact with 72% access 
when utilizing Network 1 and Network 2, and 
73% access utilizing Network 3. High-income 
and low-income residents had similar 90-
minute access levels to the CBD which ranged 
7% to 9% lower than their middle-income 
counter parts. The addition of the BRT also 
had a larger impact on low- and high-income 
groups when analyzing 90-minute access with 
low-income access at 53% utilizing Network 
1, compared to 56% utilizing Network 2 and 
Network 3, and high-income access at 55% 
utilizing Network 1, compared to 57% 
utilizing Network 2 and Network 3 (see 
Figures 2-Q and 2-S). 
 
Figure 2-R: 30-minute access to the CBD 
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  Figure 2-S: 60- and 90-minute access to the CBD 
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Transit Access by Network and Income to 
Secondary Destinations 
Access to secondary destinations, 
which includes points within land uses 
classified as agricultural lands, airports, 
industrial areas, or quarries, is much better 
than it is to the CBD across Network 1, 
Network 2 and Network 3 (see Figures 2-T, 2-
U and 2-V). However, the implementation of 
the planned future BRT system does not 
Figure 2-U: 30-minute access to secondary destinations 




improve this access without the retention of the matatu network for the thirty-minute time range. 
Figure 2-V: 60- and 90-minute access to secondary destinations 
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This is likely because the BRT system was designed specifically to provide access to the CBD. 
Concerning secondary destinations, access for low-, middle- and high-income residents actually 
decreases significantly when comparing the new BRT system without accompanying matatu 
access (Network 2) to the existing matatu system (Network 1). However, when the two systems 
are analyzed together (Network 3) access to secondary destinations for low-income residents 
increases significantly. 
 
Transit Access by Network and Income to 
Tertiary Destinations 
When considering access to tertiary 
destinations, which includes destination points 
within land uses classified as dump sites, farms, 
graveyards, parks, public spaces, and recreation 
areas, the implementation of the planned future 
BRT system does not improve this access, 
actually reducing access when analyzed 
without access to the existing matatu network 
(Network 2) for all incomes within the 30- and 
60-minute time ranges. For the 90-minute time 
range there is no difference across the 
networks, and all residents have close to 100% 
access to some tertiary destinations (see Figures 
2-W, 2-X and 2-Y). 
 









Figure 2-Y: 90-minute access to tertiary destinations  
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2.7: Discussion of Spatial Analysis Findings 
Income Based Accessibility Gaps 
Overall access to the current matatu transit network favors middle-income people. This 
was not surprising as high-income Nairobi residents are more likely to own cars, making them 
less likely to utilize the matatu routes the matatu drivers will in turn provide them with less 
access. On the opposite end of the spectrum, low-income people can likely not afford as many 
trips as middle-income people and therefore the matatu drivers will in turn provide them with 
less access as the demand is lower. However, for residential areas over 10 kilometers from the 
CBD the relationship high- and middle-income residents have better access to matatus than their 
low-income counterparts when considering the number of stops which they can access. This is a 
significant finding, as low-income residents living over 10 kilometers from the CBD are likely a 
vulnerable group for whom mobility is a daily struggle.  
When considering transit access to the CBD, middle-income residents have the highest 
access across all networks studied, and high-income residents have better access than low-
income residents even though this access is less utilized due to a increase in car ownership 
among higher income groups. The accessibility gap between low-income residents and their 
middle- and high-income counterparts only increases with the addition of the planned BRT 
system. As it is currently designed, the BRT system does provide a slight increase in access to 
the CBD across income groups. However, looking at an integrated future system which includes 
the Matatu routes as they exist does not significantly increase this access as the matatu stops and 






Impacts of Land Use on Accessibility 
Land use was also a significant factor when considering accessibility. The city of 
Nairobi’s dependence on the CBD as its economic and opportunity capital, combined with its 
sprawling residential neighborhoods, creates challenges for mobility. This was made evident 
when assessing accessibility to secondary and tertiary destinations. It was found that there is 
much improved transit access to secondary and tertiary destinations across all income groups 
when compared to CBD access. Concerning secondary and tertiary destinations, low-income 
residents actually having the overall highest transit access to tertiary destinations, and high-
income groups having the overall highest access to secondary destinations.  
This is the first study which merged a variety of unusual data sources available for 
Nairobi together in order to create a network-based analysis, and its purpose was to assess 
questions related to the process and impacts of transportation planning. Therefore, a more 
detailed analysis of land use and land use planning in Nairobi was outside of its scope. However, 
this finding demonstrates a need for more research to assess the relationship between land use 
and transportation specific to Nairobi.  
 
Future Coordinated System Design 
Access to the planned future BRT stations from residential areas varies less across 
income groups than access to the matatu stops did. In fact, for the ideal distance of 0.5-
kilometers walking access to BRT stops was found to be equal across income groups. 
Nevertheless, there is limited access to matatu stops within a reasonable walking distance of 
planned BRT stations across the BRT Lines, but when longer distances for walking are added 
this access grows significantly. For instance, it was found that at a convenient transfer distance 
of 150 meters the average planned BRT can access three matatu stops which service on average 
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five matatu lines. However, if that distance is increased to 500 meters this grows to eight matatu 
stops servicing on average 13 matatu lines. While 500 meters is far for a person to walk while 
transferring, it is not far for a matatu to alter its route assuming it is traversing a convenient 
corridor.  
Transfer access from the BRT stations to the existing matatu stops and lines increases 
when considering only the BRT stations in the CBD or only the BRT stations which service 
multiple BRT lines. However, although there is a slight increase in access to Matatu stops within 
a 150-meter and 250-meter walking distances of planned BRT stations which service multiple 





Chapter 3: Developing a Policy and 
Governance Related Understanding 
Responding to the intricacies of the 
systems and entities governing Nairobi’s 
present and future transportation plans 
through qualitative approaches, existing 
planning and governance documents were 
analyzed and information was collected on 
their relevance to, and plans for, 
transportation in Nairobi, including matatus, 
BRT, rail, non-motorized transport and more. 
Additionally, a series of semi-structured 
interviews were conducted with five key 
stakeholders. Questions included in the 
interviews revolved around Nairobi’s present 
transportation system, as well as any future 
plans. The results of both of these analyses 
were then considered together, and a series of 
clear themes emerged. 
 
3.1: Analysis of Existing Planning and 
Governance Documents 
Relevant planning and policy 
documents following the 2010 Constitution of 
Figure 3-A: Timeline of analyzed documents and the 
World Bank’s Proposed Project Restructuring Document. 
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Kenya were collected (see Figure 3-A). Plans were compared based on factors of governance, 
public perception, and intended improvements to accessibility and mobility. 
 
Constitution of Kenya (2010) 
In 2010 a new Constitution of Kenya was adopted by the Republic of Kenya following a 
two-decade long period of constitutional reform which began in the 1990s as part of a larger 
movement which spread a democratization in governance throughout many African countries. In 
Kenya, this constitutional reform was heavily influenced by local concerns and the public 
participation process, and was intended to support democratic governance, the devolution of 
power and social equity (Deacon, 2018).  
The Constitution of Kenya has had a significant impact on the country’s system of 
governance and planning processes through the implementation of a devolved system of 
governance which reallocated much of Kenya’s governance to the county level from a prior 
highly centralized system. As stated in Chapter 11, Part 1 – Objects and Principles of Devolved 
Government, the objectives of this devolution that are relevant to urban planning as a process 
include: 
To promote democratic and accountable exercise of power;  to 
foster national unity by recognizing diversity; to give powers of 
self-governance to the people and enhance the participation of the 
people in the exercise of the powers of the State and in making 
decisions affecting them; to recognize the right of communities to 
manage their own affairs and to further their development; to 
protect and promote the interests and rights of minorities and 
marginalized communities; to promote social and economic 
development and the provision of proximate, easily accessible 
services throughout Kenya; to ensure equitable sharing of national 
and local resources throughout Kenya; to facilitate the 
decentralization of State organs, their functions and services, from 
the capital of Kenya; and to enhance checks and balances and the 
separation of powers. (Republic of Kenya, 2010) 
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Other portions of the Constitution of Kenya are devoted to more urbanism focused forms 
of governance. For instance, in Chapter 11 Part 2 – County Governments, there is a section on 
urban areas and cities which details the way in which national legislation must provide for the 
governance and management of Kenya’s urban areas and cities. This includes the establishment 
of criteria meant to classify areas as cities, the establishment of the principles of governance and 
management which will be enacted within these cities, and the provision for public participation 
in governance by residents of the cities.  
Institutional collaboration, public participation and government transparency are 
constitutionally mandated as part of the Constitution of Kenya. This information is detailed in 
Chapter 11 Part 5 – Relationships between Governments. This section begins by detailing the 
ways in which the county and national governments must work together to “perform its 
functions, and exercise its powers, in a manner that respects the functional and institutional 
integrity of government at the other level, and respects the constitutional status and institutions 
of government at the other level.” Concerning public participation and government transparency, 
this section later states that county governments must conduct business in an open manner and 
facilitate public participation while not excluding any public or media unless there are 
exceptional circumstances (Republic of Kenya, 2010). 
Additionally, although the Constitution of Kenya does not mention transportation in particular, it 
does mention the Kenyan people’s right to infrastructure. This can be found under Part 3 – 
Specific Application of Rights within the Constitution of Kenya Bill of Rights it is stated that 
“the state shall put in place affirmative action programs designed to ensure that minorities and 
marginalized groups have reasonable access to water, health services and infrastructure” 
(Republic of Kenya, 2010). 
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Feasibility Study & Technical Assistance for Mass Rapid Transit System for the Nairobi 
Metropolitan Region (2011) 
This study was conducted for the Kenyan Ministry of Transport (MoT) in 2011 by CES 
and APEC Consortium Limited, a Kenya based consulting firm which provides engineering and 
planning services (APEC Consortium LTD, 2019). The funding for this project came from the 
African Development Bank (AfDB), as it predates the World Bank BRT funding which came a 
year later with the 2012 Kenya - National Urban Transport Improvement Project (The World 
Bank, 2012a).  
The study was design to tackle three key objectives. First, it should assist the national 
government of Kenya in the preparation of a comprehensive framework for a public 
transportation policy in the NMA. Second, it should complete a study on various alternative for 
mass transit systems for the NMA including heavy rail, light rail and BRT. Lastly, it should 
provide technical assistance to the MOT throughout the process (CES & APEC, 2011). 
Overall, the purpose of this plan was to select the best alternative for a future mass rapid 
transit system in Nairobi. It suggests that a multi-modal solution be implemented with high 
capacity metro rail employed along corridors where the peak hour passenger load is over 30,000, 
light rail implemented along corridors where the peak hour passenger load is over 12,000 but 
under 30,000, and BRT implemented on corridors where the peak hour passenger load is over 
5,000 but under 12,000. In the preferred alternative suggested by this plan BRT is actually only 
proposed along three corridors as many of the other require the higher capacity modes of heavy 
and light rail (CES & APEC, 2011). 
Concerning the existing matatu system, this planning document suggests that they be 
utilized as a support measure for the future mass rapid transit system. However, very little is 
specified about how this might actually work. Additionally, it is suggested that as an interim 
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solution they be reorganized to compliment conventional bus systems. It is recommended that 
only high capacity buses operate on the main corridors and that the smaller matatu vehicles be 
utilized as a feeder service. It is suggested that this reorganization be achieved by coordinating 
with existing matatu operators, and very few details about how this may actually work are 
included (CES & APEC, 2011). 
 
Kenya: National Urban Transport Improvement Project (2012) 
In 2012 the World Bank launched its National Urban Transport Improvement Project. 
This $300 million US dollar project included project components focused on improving 
transportation throughout the entire country, not just within the city of Nairobi. The project was 
governed at the national level, with the official borrower being the Republic of Kenya’s Ministry 
of Finance, and the responsible agencies being the Kenya National Highways Authority 
(KeNHA), the Kenya Urban Roads Authority (KURA), the Kenya Railways Corporation (KRC), 
the Ministry of Roads (MOR), and the Ministry of Transport (MoT). The project was intended to 
support:  
The implementation of policy and institutional reforms in 
transport, particularly urban public transport; the creation of 
institutional capacity to provide oversight and regulatory functions 
to support the delivery of urban public transport services; the 
preparation of appropriate investment interventions that would 
promote urban public mass transit systems; and financing 
infrastructure improvements to decongest major towns necessary 
to support Kenya‘s long term development strategy. (The World 
Bank, 2012a p. 15)  
 
Approximately $80.46 million US dollars was intended to support the development of 
selected mass transit corridors by the Kenyan Urban Roads Authority (KURA) and the Kenya 
Railways Corporation (KRC). The mass transit corridors are not limited to BRT, and other types 
of heavy and light rail can be explored as well. However, this portion of the project does include 
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engineering and design work specific to a BRT system, which the planning document touts as 
being a low-cost successful alternative to passenger rail which is being implemented successfully 
all over the world. The general idea for the BRT system in Nairobi envisioned in this project is 
trunk-feeder system which runs high-capacity buses within segregated bus-lanes (The World 
Bank, 2012a). 
This system is complimented by feeder buses, which in the case of Nairobi could be 
matatus, which provide first-mile last-mile transit connections for passengers. In order to provide 
a successful and integrated system like this a “meaningful consultation process with bus and 
matatu owners/operators must be initiated at the early stages of BRT system design” (The World 
Bank, 2012a p. 39). Additionally, this BRT system is seen as being a first step toward a 
comprehensive urban transportation system in Nairobi, with the World Bank stating that it will 
“lay the ground work for a successor urban transport operation, possibly to be supported by the 
(World) Bank and other development partners” (The World Bank, 2012a p. 6). 
A significant portion of funding and direction is also allocated throughout the project for 
institutional strengthening and capacity building as the document states that “it should be 
emphasized that successful introduction of BRT systems, based on (World) Bank experience 
elsewhere, requires strong political commitment to deal with deep vested interests linked to the 
provision of conventional, inefficient transport services.” Therefore, a portion of the mass transit 
corridors project requires institutional capacity development for KURA in order to ensure that 
they are able to implement urban transportation reforms as needed. Funding is also allocated for 




Importantly, this plan refers to the potential phasing-out of matatu, suggesting that they 
be replaced by higher capacity buses by the MoT through the implementation of the Integrated 
National Transport Policy (INTP). Additionally, the document states that Component B – 
Support KURA and KRC to Develop Mass Transit Corridors includes not only generalized 
preliminary support to prepare for the implementation of a BRT system, but also measures to 
“involve matatu owners and private bus operators in participating in the provision of these 
services.” Potential ways of doing this include incorporating franchises to run higher capacity 
buses on the BRT routes while the traditional matatu sized mini-buses act as feeder routes (The 
World Bank, 2012a). 
 
Nairobi Integrated Urban Development Master Plan (NIUPLAN) (2014) 
The 2014 Nairobi Integrated Urban Development Master Plan (NIUPLAN) was created 
by Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) with local oversight provided by the Nairobi 
City County (NCC). Funding for the development of this document came directly from its 
authors, JICA. The NIUPLAN had seven main objectives, the third of which was the 
implementation of multi-modal urban transport development, including road network, public 
transport, and traffic management. The recommendations designed to meet this objective include 
the introduction of bus-exclusive lanes even before the implementation of BRT, as well as the 
relocation of bus terminals and transfer points to sub-centers (JICA, 2014).  
Under the Urban Transport Development Plan within the NIUPLAN it states that the city 
of Nairobi lacks a consistent policy for the development of public transportation, and as such a 
number of relevant organizations have conducted individual studies which are often repetitive 
and contradictory. A successful policy would identify a priority mode, priority corridors, and 
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design standards. Following this, a comprehensive study could be conducted before 
implementing any new modes (JICA, 2014). 
Next, the NIUPLAN stresses the need for an effective institutional framework in order 
for the successful implementation of a mass rapid transit system. This includes the need for a 
larger involvement from Nairobi City County (NCC), which should be a member of the 
transportation development project team, in order to ensure that land use decisions and 
transportation decisions are designed to complement and enhance one another. Additionally, a 
general consensus among decision makers, passengers and matatu operators should be reached 
prior to the implementation of a new mass rapid transit system, especially the introduction of a 
BRT.  Lastly, it is suggested that a pilot demonstration be conducted in order to introduce the 
residents of Nairobi to the new BRT system (JICA, 2014). 
 
Mass Rapid Transit System (MRTS) Harmonization Study (2014) 
The 2014 MRTS Harmonization Study was developed by German consulting firm Gauff 
Consultants with local oversight provided by the MoT. Funding for this project came from the 
AfDB. The finalized MRTS Harmonization Study was unable to be obtained for the purposes of 
this study, and thus this analysis is based on information regarding this plan found within other 
planning documents as well as a November 2014 presentation of the final recommendations. 
This study was based on several key goals, which included the development of a consistent 
network of mass rapid transit corridors, the creation of a realistic strategy for the implementation 
of an integrated set of transportation solutions, minimizing parallel transportation investments 
along the same corridors, and maximizing stakeholder participation in the planning process 
(Gauff Consultants, 2014).  
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Included in this study were recommendations for five mass rapid transit system lines with 
an emphasis on BRT  (The World Bank, 2012a). BRT was selected as the mode of choice by the 
GoK for the implementation of a mass rapid transit system because of several key advantages, 
including lower costs, shorter planning and construction times, the ability to add additional 
capacity quickly, and a responsive network which can be adjusted to meet demand. Additionally, 
BRT has the ability to fit within the local context already in place as there is a large availability 
of local bus drivers, access to diesel fuel as an energy source, and local experience regarding 
maintenance for diesel buses (Gauff Consultants, 2014).  
The study utilized a three phased set of recommendations to provide a “harmonized 
approach for future development” (Gauff Consultants, 2014 p. 8). This plan includes the 
development of nine planned sub-centers which are meant to host significant economic and 
commercial activity, lessening some of the traffic heading to the CBD. Phase one of this process 
focused on existing railway lines in urban areas and the implementation of a new link the Jomo 
Kenyatta International airport. Phase two focused on existing railway lines throughout the NMA, 
and phase three includes the implementation of new links (Gauff Consultants, 2014). 
 
Nairobi Ndovu/A104 BRT Service Plan (2015) 
This study conducted by the Institute for Transportation and Development Policy (ITDP) 
in 2015 was intended to provide a service plan for the Ndovu/A104 BRT project as part of the 
planned future Nairobi BRT system. Local oversight was provided by KeNHA, who also 
requested the development of the plan. Funding for the development of this plan was provided 
through several entities including UN-Habitat, the UNEP-Global Environmental Facility 
SUSTRAN East Africa, and ITDP’s New Initiatives Program which itself is funded by Climate 
Works. This service plan provides details on where the BRT routes are, how the stations would 
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be designed, and how many passengers the BRT system would attract. The overall intent of the 
service plan is to understand how many buses should be routed onto and off of each BRT 
corridor in such a way that passengers can get to their destinations with as few transfers as 
possible (ITDP, 2015).  
The Nairobi Ndovu/A104 BRT Service Plan looked not only at maximizing the BRT 
routes, but also at how the existing matatu routes would be impacted by the planned future BRT 
system. This plan considered multiple scenarios for implementation, each of which affected a 
variety of items concerning the BRT design and planning process differently. Items affected 
include the placement of dedicated bus lanes, intersection design, station design, feeder stations, 
existing bus and matatu routes, and the financial modeling (ITDP, 2015). 
 
City Non-Motorized Transport Policy (2015) 
The City Non-Motorized Transport Policy was published in 2015 by NCC. In the case of 
this policy, Non-Motorized Transport (NMT) includes walking, bicycling, the use of 
wheelbarrows and carts, and animal transport, all of which are commonly seen in Nairobi. 
Overall, this policy document is intended to improve transportation in Nairobi by promoting 
NMT as a safe and sustainable mode. In order for this to be successful, NMT must be recognized 
and prioritized as a commonly used mode of transportation which is vitally important to the 
urban fabric of Nairobi. Institutional capacity is a key concern for the successful implementation 
of the NMT. It is important that planners, engineers, and other decision makes involved in 
Nairobi planning efforts have the capacity to support and implement this policy, and understand 





Nairobi Metropolitan Area Transport Authority Bill (2017) 
This bill established the Nairobi Metropolitan Transport Authority (NaMATA) which is 
intended to “oversee the establishment of an integrated, efficient, effective and sustainable public 
transport system” (Aden Duale, 2017 p. 1404). The most relevant of NaMATA’s powers and 
duties related to this study include its ability to formulate and oversee transportation planning 
processes including the development of master plans an integrated mass rapid transit strategy; its 
ability to control and oversee implementation of recommended transportation solutions; its 
ability to formulate and implement standards and requirements for transportation system design 
and monitor their implementations; its ability to enter into agreements and partnerships with any 
public sector agencies in order to develop and operate any related transportation infrastructure or 
services; and its ability to set fares and charges for transit. However, it does not do this 
independently and instead works in consultation with the national government, with 
representation from Nairobi City County (NCC) on its council (Duale, 2017). 
 
Project on Detailed Planning of Integrated Transport System and Loop Line in the Nairobi 
Urban Core (2018) 
The 2018 Project on Detailed Planning of Integrated Transport System and Loop Line in 
the Nairobi Urban Core was completed by the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) 
for the GoK and the NCC. transportation project was focused on Nairobi’s CBD, which was 
referred to in this document at the Nairobi Urban Core (NUC). This plan addresses several key 
issues related to urban mass transit in Nairobi’s CBD. First, it discusses the need to coordinate 
between related, and sometimes competing, transportation modes including BRT, the matatu 
network, ordinary bus service, and commuter rail service in order to understand and mitigate any 
negative impacts associate with BRT implementation (JICA, 2018).  
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According to this document, the status of each BRT line as of July 2017 ranges from “No 
Activity” to “Detailed Design (DD) Completed.” The statuses are as follows (see Figure 3-B): 
 
Status of Nairobi’s Proposed BRT Lines 
















Uhulu Highway No Activity Unknown Unknown  









Line 2 East 
(Thika Road) 
No Activity Unknown Unknown There is not room for 
BRT on Thika Road 
even after road widening 
Line 2 West 
(Langata Road) 
No Activity Unknown Unknown No space for BRT from 
Langata Cemetery to 
Bomas even after road 
widening. 
3 Chui Line 
(Njru to Show 
Ground) 
Line 3 East (Juja 
Road) 
DD Completed 
KNH to Dandra 
EU KURA Consultant is Ingerop 
Line 4 West 
(Ungong Road) 
DD On-Going EU KURA Consultant is Ingerop 
4 Kifaru Line 
(Mama Lucy 
to T-Mall) 
Line 4 East (City 
Stadium to 
Mama Lucy) 
DD On-Going AfDB KURA Consultant is Gauff 
Line 4 West (T-
Mall to City 
Stadium) 
Unknown EU KURA Consultant is Ingerop 
5 Nyati Line 
(Balozi to 
Imara) 
 Basic Design 
On-Going 
AfDB KURA  
 
The plan discusses the lack of coordination between the planned future BRT Lines 1, 3 
and 4. Currently, based on the designs of the 2014 MRTS Harmonization Study there is 
significant overlap between the routes of these three BRT lines within the CBD. However, prior 
to this plan there had not be a study to survey the impacts of this. Additionally, there is a need to 
lessen the amount of congestion within the CBD by controlling, and carefully designing, the 
Figure 3-B: Status of Nairobi’s proposed BRT lines as of July, 2017 (JICA, 2018) 
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BRT stations located there. Other issues discussed include the difficulty of level crossing at BRT 
stations in the CBD, the over estimation of the BRT’s passenger carrying capacity, the difficulty 
of land acquisition, and the necessity of a transportation demand-oriented plan (JICA, 2018).  
To mitigate and solve these issues, the Project on Detailed Planning of Integrated 
Transport System and Loop Line in the Nairobi Urban Core includes a series of 
recommendations. These planning recommendations are proposed within three larger policy-
based initiatives. Policy I - Establishment of Comprehensive Mobility Management begins with 
the improvement of existing bus and matatu services. It is suggested that this be done through a 
re-organization of the matatu and ordinary bus service routes and the replacement of routes to the 
CBD with feeder routes to the BRT system in order to lessen traffic congestion. Additionally, it 
was recommended that new bus fleet standards be implemented which include larger vehicles, 
wider entrance doors, and electric power units. Better communication and system coordination 
through the application of approaching notification systems integrated across modes is also 
suggested for the bus service system (JICA, 2018).  
Policy I also includes recommendations for improvements to the roadway network, and 
improvements to pedestrian service. For pedestrian improvements it is suggested that better 
pedestrian access be provided to the CBD through the implementation of signs and the clearing 
of access routes to multi-modal nodal points. The last sets of recommendations for Policy I are 
focused on the application of intermodal facilities that allow for easy transfers between modes, 
and the application of transportation demand management measures and policy to help reduce 
on-peak demands (JICA, 2018).  
Next, Policy II - Proposal for Future Re-alignment of BRT recommends that the current 
future planned BRT Line 3 and Line 4 be re-aligned in order to align with the existing viaduct 
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for the commuter rail in order to lessen land acquisition needs. In is also suggested that the 
planned BRT Line 1 be simplified and that the planned BRT Line 2 be modified so that it is able 
to meet the future transportation needs and demands of the western and eastern most parts of 
NCC. Lastly, Policy III - Application of Rail-based Transport System includes a 
recommendation surrounding the development of a metro rail system to connect key areas in 
CBD underground (JICA, 2018).  
 
 
3.2: Stakeholder Interviews 
Semi-structured interviews with five key stakeholders knowledgeable about 
transportation issues in Nairobi were conducted in January and February of 2019. The experts 
interviewed had a range of relevant professional expertise, including land use, labor rights, 
transportation planning, and urban development. Interview subjects were recruited via e-mail, 
and all interviews were conducted remotely through video conferencing. The interviews were 
designed to take approximately one hour in total, and began with a set of predetermined 
questions followed by a less structured conversation. Each interview began with questions 
surrounding the subjects’ career and history working in areas related to transportation issues in 
Nairobi, although this information has been kept anonymous.  
 
Nairobi’s Existing Transportation Network 
The subjects were first asked about the reliability and accessibility of Nairobi’s existing 
transportation network including roadway, commuter rail, bicycle facilities, pedestrian facilities 
and the matatu network. Those interviewed generally agreed about the overall poor state of 
Nairobi’s transportation facilities, as the city has grown rapidly and struggled to develop new 
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infrastructure, and maintain existing infrastructure, to meet the needs of this growth. One 
interview subject elaborated upon the state of the city’s current transportation conditions by 
saying that “right now it feels like we are sitting on a time bomb by just relying on the narrow 
roads that we have had since independence… with congestion already a menace.”  
Several interviewees expressed the need for the city to invest in better infrastructure for 
active forms of transportation like bicycling and walking. Although there are limited sidewalks 
and barely any bike paths, many people still gravitate towards these forms of transportation as 
they are free and often uninhibited by vehicular congestion. Although bicycling is not as 
commonly used, it was mentioned as something that could be a viable option for certain 
neighborhoods closer to the CBD if better infrastructure were built. This desire is evident by a 
growing middle-class bicycling community in the city. However, even in spite of this many still 
regard bicycling as an unsafe option which is predominately used by the poor out of necessity. 
Better infrastructure for bicycling could make more people consider it a viable transportation 
option. 
Walking is the main mode of transportation for many residents in Nairobi, but the 
infrastructural investment decisions do not reflect this. Throughout these conversations the main 
issues impacting pedestrian facilities were highlighted as being a lack of pedestrian infrastructure 
including sidewalks and crossing facilities; and issues of encroachment with informal and formal 
buildings, electricity cables, and motorbikes all taking up space on already crowded sidewalks.  
Personal vehicle use was also a subject which those interviewed felt it was important to 
discuss in depth; as car ownership continues to increase among the wealthier people in Nairobi 
causing significant traffic, congestion and air quality issues. One interview subject described 
Nairobi’s roadways as being “chaotic, congested, and full of private cars.” When speaking about 
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why there was such a growth in private vehicle ownership, discussions focused on the city’s 
choices to invest in roadway expansion as opposed to public transit improvements, with one 
interviewee stating that: 
[the] focus on road expansion is definitely encouraging the 
population to feel like they should own cars; [while] at the same 
time… people feel the inadequacy of public transport, because 
public transport is not as reliable, it is not as efficient, in some 
instances it is not as safe, and it is not as dignifying.  
 
Additionally, issues of urban sprawl and poor land use planning were also brought up 
many times when discussing growing car dependence, with one interviewee stating that “as more 
and more people live further away from the city center so their commutes become longer and 
more inconvenient and people would like to own private cars.” 
The matatu network was also heavily discussed throughout the interviews. Overall, the 
interviewees agreed that the matatu network serves an integral role in the transportation and 
mobility options for the residents of Nairobi, especially considering the lack of governmental 
oversight and support for the system, with one subject stating that “for such an elaborate network 
to exist without the intervention of the government is itself a very innovative thing.”  
Those interviewed agreed that the system is able to be incredibly responsive and alter the 
system to respond to demand. However, many flaws in the matatu network were also brought up, 
the most common of which were the lack of regulation for vehicular maintenance, safety and 
emissions standards; lack of enforcement of speed limits and driving behavior; and the lack of 
standardization, transparency and affordability of the fare. Regarding this point on affordability, 
one interviewee stated that “some people take it for granted that they can afford the matatu fares, 
but there are so many people who live in informal settlements who are walking to work and back 
home because they cannot afford the fares.”  
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Governance and Transportation Planning as a Process 
The interview focused on past and present transportation planning and governance issues 
which have impacted the City of Nairobi. The subjects were asked which transportation planning 
documents out of those analyzed for this study (see Figure 3-A), were most likely to be 
implemented in the future based on their professional knowledge. Although there was no 
consensus on which plans were most important or most likely to be implemented, many 
interviewees did stress the general interest which planning officials and those in power have in 
the implementation of a BRT system, with one person stating that “the government seems really 
interested in seeing how a BRT system could be rolled out, if it is going to work, and how it 
could potentially decongest the city.” It was suggested that although it was not certain which of 
the BRT plans or designs were the most likely to be followed, plans that involve the 
implementation of a BRT system should be looked at with optimism.  
Additionally, the 2015 City Non-Motorized Transport Policy was also brought up as a 
document which is likely to be implemented by several interviewees. This was based on the fact 
that there is currently a lot of focus on the need for sustainable mobility as an option which can 
reduce traffic, and improve air quality. There have also been recent initiatives which align with 
the goals of this policy like the potential for citywide car free days, but the impact of these and 
whether or not they would actually be implemented is unknown.  
Interview subjects remarked on Nairobi’s present transportation network and habits, 
particularly the design and use the existing matatu network, were considered in the development 
of the planning and policy documents which are slated to govern Nairobi’s transportation future. 
Overall, interviewees were concerned about the general lack in transparency regarding who was 
involved in the decision making for the new BRT system, with several people pointing out that 
the matatu industry had not been involved or included in the conversations concerning the 
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development of a BRT system. One interviewee underlined the importance of this issue by 
stating that the:  
BRT planning [process] overall has been regarded as an 
engineering problem, but the actual introduction of the BRT 
system is far more about the political economy of the matatu 
system than the design of the infrastructure.  
 
In general, it was stated that because the matatus are not formally planned by the city, 
much of the formal planning is done in a way that does not consider them. One interview 
participant summed this up by saying that the planning process in Nairobi “has always been one 
that plans for the ideals, as opposed to the realities,” while another described the plans for the 
BRT system as being an attempt at “a re-formalization of the transportation system.” 
Although several interviewees did believe that the most popular matatu routes were 
utilized as the basis of many of the BRT designs, many were concerned about the plans ability to 
incorporate the matatu system as feeder routes, something which several of the people 
interviewed saw as being critical to the planned BRT systems success. One interviewee stated 
that “just building the BRT system will not resolve the problem of congestion… the operations 
of both (the BRT and the matatu) systems is critical.” They went on to elaborate on the need for 
the matatu and the BRT to have schedules which compliment each other in order to facilitate 
easy transfers and heighten connectivity to areas which are not located close to BRT stations.  
Several of the stakeholders interviewed openly questioned whether the implementation of 
a BRT system was even the best alternative for improving transportation in Nairobi. One 
interviewee elaborated on this by talking about how BRT systems are based on a model which 
required a country to take on significant amounts of debt, something which they are uncertain is 
in the best interest of the Kenyan government. Others brought up competitive proposals from 
international entities to fund other types of transportation infrastructure, often more geared 
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toward traditional vehicular transportation. Additionally, interviewees felt that the BRT plans 
were being posed as singular solution to a multi-faceted issue, with one person stating that an 
“integrated, efficient, and sustainable passenger transport system in Nairobi will never be just 
BRT; even if there the BRT system is successful, there will still need to be a huge matatu 
system.”  
Governance, relationships, and the institutional capacity were also brought up as an 
important issue by interviewees. In fact, according to many of the people interviewed often the 
most critical issues standing in the way of Nairobi’s ability to plan for, and implement, a 
successful transportation system have to do with relationships between various stakeholders. The 
most critical relationships discussed by interviewees which are impacting this process include the 
relationship between the government and the matatu industry, the relationships between matatu 
drivers, the relationship between the government and funding organization like the World Bank, 
and the relationships between varying governmental institutions.  
Land use was also a topic that came up in several of these interviews. Conversations 
revolved around the land use issues Nairobi is currently facing because of its growing urban 
sprawl and the CBD’s role as the highly centralized economic center, and the way that this is 
impacting transportation. Overall, subjects who discussed land use during their interviews 
seemed to feel that any comprehensive transportation solution for Nairobi would have to 
consider recommendations which would alter these problematic land use patterns for the plan to 
be successful. One interviewee stated that:  
Land use has many important factors including mobility 
management, density, and site design which have implications for 
transport… by looking at land use policy you can see if there is 





The involvement, or lack thereof, of the public through participatory planning processes 
was something which was spoken about in several of the interviews. it was generally agreed 
upon that public engagement and inclusion in the planning process is something that Nairobi 
residents desire strongly. This type of participation is also something which is required by the 
topic of the 2010 Kenyan Constitution, as several of the people interviewed pointed out that the 
constitution states that the planning process must engage citizens. One interview participant 
suggested that the reason this constitutional mandate is not leading to increased public 
participation in planning could be tied to the lack of a national policy. However, they mentioned 
that a draft national policy is under consideration, and that this policy would not only include 
enforcement measure to ensure that public participation is part of the planning process, but 
would also include instructions and recommendations intended to help planners know how to 
include public participation.  
These conversations also often led into discussions concerning the overall public opinion 
of the planned BRT system. According to those interviewed, it seems like the general public 
support the project as they believe that traffic congestion is a significant issue, and their largest 
transportation concerns are often related to time, safety and cost; issues which the BRT system 
promises to mitigate. Opposition does exist from both the matatu industry, who often do not 
know how they will fit into the transportation system in the future, and from members of the 
general public. Interviewees often felt that much of the opposition which exists from the general 
public comes from fear and mistrust of the government which is often a result of a significant 
amount of contradictory information, or missing information, regarding when and if the BRT 




3.3: Discussion of Policy and Governance Related Findings 
Current Transportation Conditions 
The lack of a well-designed, accessible, and equitable transportation system is causing 
significant problems for Nairobi citizens. Roadways are generally unsafe, and commute times are 
cumbersome. Although the existing matatu system serves the transportation needs of many 
people, it does so in a way that is often unsafe, unreliable, and unequal. Additionally, there is a 
need for investment in improved non-motorized transportation options throughout the city as 
walking and bicycling are critical forms of transportation, especially for the urban poor, but this 
importance is not reflected by current infrastructural investment. 
 
Land Use 
Nairobi’s current land use patterns pose significant issues to its transportation system. 
Presently there is heavy reliance on the CBD as the economic, commercial and cultural center of 
not only the city, but the country as a whole. This makes the demand to travel into this area very 
high and contributes significantly to congestion. Additionally, the city hosts a substantial amount 
of urban sprawl, a land use pattern which is only increasing with the growth in population. 
Sprawl has a significant impact on transportation as those who live further from the CBD often 
have fewer resources in their immediate vicinity and have to spend large amounts of time 
traveling in order to meet their daily needs.  
There is currently not a significant planning effort focused on the integration of 
transportation and land use planning in Nairobi concerning the development of a BRT-based 
mass rapid transit system. However, this type of collaborative effort is critical to the 
development transportation system as the City’s land use patterns and reliance on the Central 
Business District have a significant impact of the transportation issues. Some of the 
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transportation plans do call for investment in a series of secondary destination areas which would 
be intended to compete with the CBD and would be accessible via the planned future mass rapid 
transit system.  
The implementation of Transportation Demand Management (TDM) strategies to relieve 
congestion has also been recommended. The overarching goal of TDM strategies are to lessen 
the demand for transport by making the movement of people and goods more efficient. This is 
done through the implementation of strategies which work to alter transportation behaviors and 
rationalize transportation structures through the integration of spatial, land use, transport, and 
mobility planning efforts (Barcik & Bylinko, 2018).    
 
Transportation Planning as a Process 
Transit goals and plans, many of which are specific to the design and implementation of a 
BRT system, have continually been set in planning documents and have continually remained 
unrealized resulting in repetition across documents and work efforts. These transportation 
projects have been planned by a variety of consultants through a series of local agencies 
dependent on an assortment of local and international funding sources (see Table 3-A). It is clear 
that often the implementing agency or the funder embeds within the planning process their own 
desires and ideas. This has led to the development of repetitive plans which often echo each 
other, but do not always support the same recommendations or even recommendations which 
could be considered complimentary.  
There is also current competition in large scale transportation solutions from various 
international entities which is further delaying the implementation of any mass rapid transit 
solutions including BRT implementation. Often these projects come with desirable levels of 
funding which would make them easy to implement and seen as a positive thing politically for 
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those in power who want to be seen as though they are making improvements. The “large and 
distorting role of external actors” is a known influencing factor in Nairobi’s transportation 
planning efforts, with 56% of road construction financing from 2003 to 2007 coming from 
external funders (Klopp, 2012, p. 3). This has caused the development and potential development 
of many large-scale transportation infrastructure projects, like the widening of existing highways 
and the development of new highways, even though this type of automobile-oriented 
development often contradicts not only the city’s stated transportation and climate goals, but also 
the agreed upon vision for Nairobi’s transportation future which was decided upon through the 
planning processes. 
The devolution of government implemented by the 2010 Kenyan Constitution and the 
formation of the Nairobi Metropolitan Transport Authority (NaMATA) to work directly under 
the central government to manage the planning efforts for a new mass rapid transit system have 
played significant roles in the structure of governance for urban planning projects. Although the 
NCC has acquired the responsibility for road transport in Nairobi through the new constitution, 
NaMATAs efforts working directly under the GoK as opposed to NCC has brought about new 
conflict over who exactly owns, controls and is responsible for transportation Nairobi’s 
roadways, and in turn any future BRT based mass rapid transit system. This confusion has 
created even more burdens for transportation planning efforts as some Kenyan constitutional 
scholars bring into question NaMATA’s right to even exist within its current structure.  
Although the 2010 Kenyan Constitution requires participatory planning processes, 
strategies for public participation are largely absent from Nairobi’s transportation planning 
documents and from the BRT planning process. This includes both collaboration efforts with key 
stakeholders in particular the matatu industry as well as general public outreach and engagement 
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with potentially affected communities. Resistance from the matatu industry was listed as a 
potential threat which should be carefully mitigated through outreach and collaboration in many 
of the surveyed planning documents, however it appears like this warning were not headed as not 
much effort has been put into measures which would ensure that the matatu industry is on board. 
Therefore, there has been significant resistance to the planned BRT system has come from the 
matatu unions and SACCOs who fear that any transportation reform will be a direct threat to 
their livelihood. 
It appears that the involvement of the matatu industry in the discussions concerning 
Nairobi’s potential future mass rapid transit system has been growing. However, this new growth 
seems to be spurred from the work of the United Kingdom based Global Labor Institute who 
published the Nairobi Bus Rapid Transit Labor Impact Assessment Research Report in January, 
2019. Prior to this, there was little publicity about the impacts of a potential BRT system. 
However, the production of the report involved significant engagement with the matatu industry 
and has lead to some political motivation to improving the relationship between the matatu 
industry and those in charge of the BRT planning process by putting it into the spotlight.  
Public opinion is passively supportive of the Bus Rapid Transit system as residents of 
Nairobi main transportation concerns revolve around the variables of time and cost. However, 
the general public is not well informed of the proposed, planned or potential changes which 
could affect the transportation system on which they rely. This lack of knowledge is based on the 
government’s lack transparency during past and present city planning and development projects. 
This has led to institutional trust issues which have made the public wary of any large-scale 
infrastructure projects. As public information and updates regarding transportation planning 
efforts have not been provided by the government agencies there has instead been a reliance on 
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news media. However, these issues are compounded by insufficient media coverage, which itself 
is unreliable as most news sources are politically influenced, and often media companies will not 
print stories without extra pay or bribery.  
 
Future Coordinated System Design 
Planning and design efforts for the future of transportation in Nairobi have not done a 
sufficient job understanding the role which matatus play in the current transportation network or 
the way in which they may be a necessary supplement to any mass rapid transit systems 
implemented in the future. It appears that planned BRT routes have been designed to mitigate 
issues of congestion and density, and meet future development goals, often ignoring significant 
equity and accessibility needs.  
It is assumed that transportation planning efforts for the planned BRT system design 
likely took the Matatu route and stop locations into consideration when assessing key areas and 
corridors of demand, and some planning documents call for the use of matatus as a system of 
feeder routes for the planned BRT. However, the planned future BRT system has not be 
thoughtfully designed in a way that will allow for the matatus to successfully support it in the 
future. An emphasis should be put on accommodating matatu pick-up and drop-off at BRT 
stations, especially those outside of the CBD.  
Additionally, operations and schedule planning is a concern for both the matatu system as 
it exists, as well as its potential coordination with the proposed BRT system in the future. This is 
something that is often not considered within present planning efforts aside from the 2014 ITDP 
Nairobi Ndovu/A104 BRT Service Plan. Planning routes along most systems must be timed in a 
way which allows for easy transfers. It seems like any necessary system design efforts required 
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for the use of matatus as a feeder system to the BRT system has been left as a responsibility of 
the matatu industry.  
There are many concerns over whether the true capacity of the future BRT system is 
being over estimated. Older planning documents tended to suggest the implementation of other 
types of mass rapid transit systems such as heavy and light rail to service Nairobi’s busiest 
corridors. However, the plans shifted in preference to BRT likely because of cost constraints as 
well as overall funding option and preferences. In the newest planning document studied, the 
2018 Project on Detailed Planning of Integrated Transport System and Loop Line in the Nairobi 
Urban Core, the idea of utilizing other forms of mass rapid transit in order to insure that capacity 




Chapter 4: Discussion and Conclusions 
4.1: The Relationship Between Effective Governance and Successful Transportation 
Infrastructure 
The World Bank’s 2012 Kenya: National Urban Transport Improvement Project, 
discussed several times throughout the course of this study, was approved on August 2, 2012. 
This project allocated $300 million USD to improving transportation systems, as well as 
transportation related governance and institutional capacity building throughout Kenya. 
Approximately 85% of this funding was allocated to the category of Urban Roads and Highways, 
which would include the planning, design and implementation of a BRT system for the NMA 
(The World Bank, 2012a).  
In the World Bank published Project Appraisal document, dated July, 2012, it was 
recognized that a multitude of governance and institutional issues posed a significant threat to the 
success of the project. Governance in the Kenyan transportation sector has been an ongoing 
challenge throughout the country’s history, with the main problems stemming from complicated 
institutional arrangements; a lack of transparency surrounding who owns and/or is responsible 
for roadways; methods of bid related fraud and collusion; as well as implementation related fraud 
(The World Bank, 2012a).  
In general, it was stated that in Kenya “ineffective institutional structures and weak legal 
and regulatory framework have impacted negatively on the quality, reliability and safety for the 
public transport users, particularly in urban areas” (The World Bank, 2012a p. 7). As the World 
Bank underscored the need for effective urban governance, institutional structures, and political 
commitment in order for successful implementation of a BRT based mass rapid transit system, 
these issues were considered to be threats to the project, which was ultimately halted for a 
proposed restructuring on December 26, 2018. This followed six years of work and the allocation 
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of $62.01 million USD, approximately 21% of the overall project funding (The World Bank, 
2012a). 
The rationale for the project restructuring8 was based on a series of institutional issues 
and changes, problems providing the counterpart funding required from the GoK, and the overall 
failure to disburse the allocated $300 million USD by the project’s end date of December 31, 
2018. Some of the institutional issues and changes which affected this project include the 
impacts of the government decentralization and devolution that happened as a result of the 2010 
Kenyan Constitution; the new urban transportation strategy developed by the GoK; the 
implementation of NaMATA; and the GoK’s identification of a new set of mass transit corridors 
which includes BRT. The restructuring for the project includes the cancellation of all 
undisbursed fund (a value of $207.47 million USD), the revision of each project’s components 
budgeted cost, and amendments to the project’s financing agreement (The World Bank, 2012a). 
What will happen concerning the implementation of a new BRT-based mass rapid transit 
system in Nairobi is yet to be determined, but this interesting and important sequence of events 
brings into question the cyclical relationship between effective urban governance and successful 
transportation planning and infrastructure. There is a growing debate surrounding the need to 
transform urban governance before successful social cohesion, economic development, and 
infrastructural strategies can be implemented (Gandy, 2006). Existing infrastructure is often 
critical to the development of effective governance systems as it is hard for large-scale 
                                                 
8 Restructuring is something that can be agreed upon by the World Bank, the borrower, and the member country 
during the implementation of a typical World Bank funded project. The intent of a project restructuring is to 
“strengthen its development effectiveness, modify its development objectives, improve Project performance, modify 
indicators, address risks and problems that have arisen during implementation, make appropriate use of undisbursed 
proceeds of a Bank Loan, cancel unwithdrawn amounts of a Bank Loan prior to the Loan Closing Date, extend the 
Closing Date, or otherwise respond to changed circumstances” (The World Bank, 2017 p. 7).  
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institutional change to happen when there is a level of uncertainty about where and how 
communities will access their daily needs due to insufficient infrastructure; including, but not 
limited to, transportation systems. This brings to question the idea that perhaps before cities with 
failing infrastructure can create a successful system of governance, they must first implement 
infrastructural systems which forge “social collectivities through the ‘binding of space’” (Gandy, 
2006 p. 390).  
In the case of Nairobi’s transportation planning efforts, especially considering the 
development of a new BRT-based mass rapid transit system, it is unclear what the root of the 
problem is. Is it that the lack of effective governance which is inhibiting the planning, 
development and implementation of successful transportation infrastructure? Or is it instead the 
lack of successful transportation infrastructure which is in fact inhibiting the creation of an 
effective system of governance? The 2012 World Bank project was attempting to solve both of 
these issues at the same time. However, the halting of the project for a formal restructuring three 
days before its slated end with approximately 21% of funds dispersed, makes it evident that that 
strategy has so far been unsuccessful. The results of this study lay the groundwork to showcase 
this debate through a first of its kind network analysis in Nairobi, but more direct research into 
the relationship between effective governance and a successful transportation system in Nairobi 
is needed to understand the best ways to tackle these separate but related problems.  
 
4.2: Current State of BRT based Mass Rapid Transit Planning in Nairobi 
As has become evident through the results of this study’s spatial, governance, and policy 
related research, present plans for the implementation of a BRT based mass rapid transit system 
in Nairobi do not seem to be designed for the benefit of the city’s existing population and can 
instead be seen as a neoliberal project. While advocates for BRT see it for its potential to provide 
77 
 
new economic opportunities, skeptics focus on its use a tool which benefits only populations 
which the city hopes to attract, as opposed to the people who already live there (Gauthier and 
Weinstock, 2010; Paget-Seekins, 2015).  
Neoliberalism’s influence on the transportation system in Nairobi began in before any 
discussions of a BRT based mass rapid transit system, and can be seen first with the roll back of 
the state’s power over transportation and the dismantling of Nairobi’s former bus system. This 
led to the rise in the matatu network in the first place as the people of Nairobi took control of 
their own right to the city and altered its transportation system to meet their needs. However, the 
state has now reversed its view and is backing a series of large-scale state initiatives in an 
attempt to reinvent transportation systems in order to support and promote the interests and 
ideals of private capital.  
These plans were created designed without the implementation of comprehensive public 
engagement strategies which would have provided an avenue for input from the people in 
Nairobi, as well as key stakeholders like the matatu industry. This goes directly against Kenya’s 
2010 Constitution which requires that any potentially affected members of the public be 
involved. Instead, the plans seem to be part of an underlying effort to transform Nairobi into 
“global city,” by taking advantage of the city’s ability to cater to forces of elite global 
consumption and erase evidence of the paratransit system. Unpacking what has led to the current 
state of BRT based mass rapid transit planning in Nairobi is critical, as the results of 
transportation planning efforts: 
If done well… can play an enormous role in improving health, 
equity, efficiency and overall quality of ‘cityness’. If done 
poorly… can intensify struggles over urban land and space, 
contributing to poverty and the violence and terror of everyday city 
life. (Klopp, 2012 p. 2)  
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Prior to the halting of the World Bank’s 2012 Kenya: National Urban Transport 
Improvement Project, several steps were taken towards the implementation of a BRT system in 
Nairobi, although clear and reliable information about what is going on is very challenging to 
find. If and when a BRT system comes to Nairobi, as well as at what level it would operate, 
remains unclear (Spooner & Manga, 2019). There is not an exact definition of what constitutes a 
true BRT system, or what separates it from a more traditional bus system with express services. 
However, according to ITDP, an international transportation focused organization whose Africa 
regional headquarters is located in Nairobi, the most basic criteria which must be included in 
order for a bus system to be classified as a BRT consists of a dedicated right-of-way, busway 
alignment, an off-board fare collection system, intersection treatments intended to reduce delays, 
and level boarding (ITDP, 2019; Spooner & Manga, 2019). Whether Nairobi’s BRT system will 
be implemented in a way that realizes these key characteristics is open to debate, but at this point 
it seems unlikely.  
It seems possible that what will end up being implemented in Nairobi could be classified 
as a “BRT-Lite” system which may include light rail and other mass rapid transit improvements. 
Even more minimal and further from what a BRT system should be, it is also possible that what 
ends up being executed in Nairobi could simply be a new fleet of larger buses which utilize the 
existing roadway infrastructure but having been branded as BRT (Spooner & Manga, 2019). 
However, without the necessary infrastructure this system would be subject to the same high 
levels traffic congestion that limits the mobility and increases travel times for every other 
roadway user, from the signal occupancy vehicle (SOV) to the matatu.  
Confusion about the current state of the development of a BRT based mass rapid transit 
system in Nairobi comes in huge part from the fact that what is seen and heard in the public 
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realm does not always match the reality of the situation. For instance, in April of 2018 pink lanes 
were painted on Thika Superhighway which were, according to the MoT, the first stage of the 
Line 2: Simba, Bomas to Ruiru, which was chosen to be the pilot lane for the project. A series of 
intermediary buses run by the National Youth Services were slated to operate on the corridor and 
run express service into the CBD (Spooner & Manga, 2019). However, as of February 2019, 
these lanes continued to support traditional mixed traffic as part of normal roadway operations, 
and were not functioning as express lanes for high capacity buses as promised. The state of this 
proposed pilot project is unknown. 
In October of 2018 Kenya’s president Uhuru Kenyatta announced that the preliminary 
stages of the Nairobi BRT system would be ready by mid-December 2018. A few weeks after 
that it was reported by the Kenyan press that the BRT had stalled due to a lack of funds to both 
build the infrastructure and purchase their own high-capacity buses (Spooner & Manga, 2019). 
Then, two months later the GoK requested that the World Bank’s 2012 Kenya: National Urban 
Transport Improvement Project, which could have provided significant funding to the 
development of this project, be halted for the proposed project restructuring (The World Bank, 
2018). It is also critical to note that these issues are further compounded by insufficient and 
biased media coverage, as most news sources are politically influenced and involved in bribery 
schemes. The cause and intent of this misinformation remains unclear and further qualitative 
research would be required in order to develop a better understanding of the root of these issues 
and develop mitigation measures to ensure project transparency in the future.  
Additionally, the proposed implementation for the BRT based mass rapid transit system 
planned for Nairobi is quite complicated. As explained within the 2018 Project on Detailed 
Planning of Integrated Transport System and Loop Line in the Nairobi Urban Core developed by 
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JICA, different local agencies, funders and consultants are working across the system. Some 
entities are involved in only a small segment of one line while others are involved in longer 
portions, but no one entity is involved in all pieces.  
Presently, funding for the various line segments is coming from the World Bank 
(segments of Line 1), the AfDB (segments of Line 4 and Line 5), and the EU (segments of Line 
3 and Line 4). For the rest of the segments, including the entirety of Line 2, funding is unknown. 
Additionally, both KeNHA and KURA are in charge of different segments, as are multiple 
consultants. This type of implementation plan leads not only to confusion and risk for the success 
of the project, but it could also easily contribute to a lack of uniformity across the system that 
could lower the operations for the corridor as a whole.  
 
4.3: Reframing Mass Rapid Transit and BRT Planning in Nairobi for Success 
The World Bank’s 2012 Kenya: National Urban Transport Improvement Project was 
halted for restructuring for a series of complex reasons. The transportation crisis in Nairobi is 
multifaceted and can be contributed to a variety of political, economic, and social factors from 
local, regional, and global forces. There is also a growing type of technocratic urban politics in 
the delivery of urban systems which has the potential to increase already large transportation and 
mobility inequalities across Nairobi’s diverse communities. A number of lessons have been 
learned through the research conducted in this study which should be considered as plans for a 
future mass rapid transit system in Nairobi, be it BRT based or not, move forward. 
 
Planning Process and Governance Considerations 
Nairobi’s lack of an efficient, reliable and equitable multi-modal transportation system is 
a daily struggle for residents. Because of this, there is a great desire for the implementation of a 
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high-quality mass rapid transit system, and public opinion over these types of improvements is 
generally positive. The goal of implementing this type of system, through buses, BRT, rail or a 
combination, is stated in many of the planning documents discussing Nairobi’s transportation 
future. However, for a variety of complex reasons, mass transit improvements have historically 
been ignored in favor of automobile centric transportation developments which predominantly 
help the wealthy. These decisions are often politically motivated as public figures want to be 
seen as productive by being able to claim large-scale infrastructure projects to their name, and 
roadway related projects are often easier to implement. To combat this series of factors, Nairobi 
must enact policy which aids in the prioritization of mass transit improvements.  
Concerning the planning process specifically, public engagement is critical to the success 
of any planning related project, and the new 2010 Kenyan constitution even requires that any 
potentially affected members of the public be involved. The constitution states that county 
governments, like that of the NCC, must make public participation and government transparency 
a priority by conducting business in an open manner, facilitating public participation and not 
excluding any public or media without exceptional circumstances (Republic of Kenya, 2010). 
However, public participation was not something that was included successfully or significantly 
in the process of planning the City’s potential future BRT based mass rapid transit system.  
Stakeholder collaboration with interested parties is also of vital importance. Much 
resistance to the planned BRT based mass rapid transit system has come from the matatu 
industry through their unions and SACCOs. This happened even though most planning 
documents, including the World Bank’s 2012 Kenya: National Urban Transport Improvement 
Project, which provided significant funding for a variety of governance and institutional capacity 
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building elements, acknowledged the matatu industry as a risk, and recommended early and 
frequent collaboration with industry leaders as a strategy to mitigate these concerns.  
It has been recognized time and time again that the inclusion of all stakeholders is 
necessary for the successful planning and delivery of a BRT project in an African city with a 
paratransit industry. Prior to implementation, significant effort must be put into discussions and 
consensus building strategies among key stakeholders (Spooner & Manga, 2019). The World 
Bank has even said in one of its previous projects, that successful implementation of a BRT 
system in these types of cities:  
Requires ownership by existing operators, drivers and users and 
incorporation of their specific concerns in the design… bringing 
the operators on board; and understanding needs of users through 
surveys and focus group discussions. Investments in BRT 
‘hardware’ will come about only after an understanding and 
acceptance of the broader reform program and an appreciation of 
the complexity of issues involved. (The World Bank, 2007 qtd in 
Spooner & Manga, 2019 p. 34) 
 
Even in spite of all of this, the implementation of BRT projects in African cities has a 
history of not utilizing inclusive planning efforts, especially concerning stakeholders within the 
paratransit industry, which has led to both poor-quality BRT systems, and failed BRT projects.  
In Nairobi, the situation has followed these same patterns, and matatu industry 
stakeholders have not been sufficiently involved in planning efforts for the future BRT based 
mass rapid transit system. There has been an effort from those involved in the planning process 
to include representation from matatu vehicle owners, but it cannot be assumed that these voices 
are representative of the industry as a whole. In general, matatu vehicle owners and the overall 
matatu workforce have different interests. Therefore, it is important to the success of the project 
that representatives of both the matatu vehicle owners and the workers whose livelihoods depend 
on the matatu industry be included in the process (Spooner & Manga, 2019). 
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In general, the awareness of the matatu workforce about the BRT project is low but 
growing. However, with this growth in awareness has come a growing opposition to the planned 
BRT systems from the matatu workforce. This negativity stems largely from a fear of potential 
job loss, a fear which is not unfounded as it is estimated that half of matatu industry jobs are at 
risk (Spooner & Manga, 2019). This poses significant risk to the success of the BRT project as 
paratransit stakeholders have significant political power “which could be helpful in affecting the 
(implementation of a BRT system) or could become an insurmountable obstacle” (Kumar et al., 
2012 p. 6). As of January 2019, neither the matatu workers or their representative organizations 
had been given an opportunity to be involved in the planning process for the future BRT system 
in Nairobi (Spooner & Manga, 2019).  
Having a constitutional mandate does not seem to be the catalyst for increased public 
participation in the urban and transportation planning process that Nairobi requires. In order to 
elevate the importance of this constitutional mandate, a national policy would be essential, with a 
draft of such a policy currently already under consideration. The intent of this policy would be to 
not only provide a platform for enforcement of the constitutional mandate, but also to include 
instructions and recommendations intended to help planners know how to go about 
implementing the required transparency and public involvement. In addition to general public 
engagement and key stakeholder collaboration efforts, overall public transparency concerning 
transportation planning and implementation efforts is critical.  
Another important consideration concerning governance and the overall planning process 
uncovered during this study is the waste caused by the creation of repetitive plans and reports. 
Existing planning documents should be assessed and measured before a new plan is slated for 
development, and collaboration surrounding planning objectives should be implemented across 
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relevant agencies. Presently, there is much repetition between the documents which is 
economically wasteful, and also leads to competing objectives and the lack of a unified vision for 
the city’s future transportation system. For instance, in 2014 alone the NIUPLAN was developed 
and funding by JICA for the local NCC, while the MRTS Harmonization Study was developed 
by Gauff Consultants for the national MoT and funded by the AfDB (Gauff Consultants, 2014; 
JICA, 2014). Both plans analyzed and developed objectives for transportation in Nairobi. Higher 
levels of collaboration among local institutions, in this case NCC and MoT, could have 
prevented this repetition and potentially saved funding for design or implementation.  
Land use is another critical consideration that must be acknowledged in unison with 
transportation related planning efforts. For Nairobi specifically, land use reform is essential for 
the implementation of a successful transit system. During assessments of access to secondary and 
tertiary destinations more people, particularly low-income people, were able to access these areas 
in a timely manner than are able to access the CBD. This is something which is supported by the 
sub-centers proposed within the several of the planning documents analyzed including the 2014 
Nairobi Integrated Urban Development Master Plan (NIUPLAN) as well as the 2014 MRTS 
Harmonization Study (Gauff Consultants, 2014; JICA, 2014). The set of nine transit accessible 
sub-centers within the MRTS Harmonization plan could lower peak hour demand to reach the 
CBD. Reforming land use in a way which helps to move formal jobs and employment 
opportunities into areas other than the CBD could increase access and economic prospects for 
many. 
As reflected through plan analysis, interviews, and the spatial analysis, Nairobi’s 
transportation issues are heavily tied to its land use patterns. However, although this study 
looked into land use slightly within the network analysis, a detailed examination of the effects of 
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land use planning and decisions on transportation, and the effects of transportation planning and 
decisions on land use, was not within the scope of this study. Therefore, a more detailed analysis 
of land use and land use planning to assess the relationship between land use and transportation 
in Nairobi is needed. 
 
Open Data as a Planning Priority  
The lack of conventional urban data available for Nairobi presents a significant barrier to 
urban planning efforts concerning the city’s future transportation system. In order to overcome 
this barrier, projects which will serve as a catalyst for data creation and sharing should be 
emphasized when scoping future urban planning and transportation projects for the future of 
Nairobi. Initiatives which would incentive the creation and publication of open urban data should 
be emphasized. Additionally, data-based analysis should be required as part of the transportation 
planning process when feasible. These efforts can give urban planners and decision-makers in 
Nairobi a better understanding of daily travel, which could in turn aid in the development of 
data-based solutions to many transportation issues. 
The obvious benefits of the creation of data for transportation in Nairobi can be seen 
through the Digital Matatus Project; which collected and openly shared existing matatu route and 
stop data. The efforts through this project allowed for increased efficiency and use of the matatu 
system, the creation a new comprehensive map of the system which is now sanctioned as the 
official matatu paratransit system map by the Nairobi government (Williams et al., 2015). 
Additionally, the benefits of a data-based analysis ca n be seen through the results of this study’s 
spatial analysis, which pieced together several data sources including the Digital Matatu’s data in 




Transportation System Design Considerations 
No matter how a BRT based mass rapid transit system is implemented, the matatu 
network will continue to play a critical role in Nairobi’s transportation network. The BRT 
System should be designed to accommodate the Matatu Network as a first-mile, last-mile 
connection. This was made evident during the BRT station accessibility analysis which showed 
that at 0.5 kilometers only 2% of Nairobi residents will have access pedestrian to a BRT stations. 
This is opposed to 48% of low-income residents, 58% of middle-income residents, and 54% of 
high-income residents with access to a matatu stop at that distance.  
For a connected and integrated multi-modal system it is also critical for transfers to be 
considered within the design of the system. However, this does not appear to have happened on a 
large scale within Nairobi’s BRT planning process. First of all, the lack of adequate coordination 
and collaboration with the matatu industry, among other things, shows that the planning for the 
relocation of matatu stops into the vicinity of planned BRT stations has not been thought about 
critically. Instead, it appears that the planning for this collaboration will once again fall onto the 
matatu drivers, who have been acting as transportation planners for the system in the absence of 
a formalized transportation planning for as long as the system has existed (J. Klopp & Mitullah, 
2016). However, with the introduction of BRT it seems like careful and formalized planning to 
facilitate the location of matatu stops, as well the integration of designed matatu drop-off and 
pick-up areas, is integral to the safety and ease of passengers making transfers.  
Secondly, if it is assumed that people will transfer from the matatu system to the BRT 
system operations planning as well as fare policies, and the potential for transfer tickets, is also 
critical. Operations planning has been done for the Ndovu/A104 BRT project, and within this 
document the importance of such a plan for each of the lines was expressed (ITDP & UN 
Habitat, 2015). However, operations and scheduling is critical for the successful integration of 
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the matatu and the BRT systems, and must be coordinated between the systems. An operations 
and scheduling plan for the BRT system only helps so much if the matatus always drop people 
off right after the BRT bus departs from the station and the passengers are forced to wait for the 
next bus. Again, it seems like the matatu industry is expected to conform to the BRT plans and 
schedule their operations around that of the BRT even though they have not been included in the 
process. 
Concerning fare policies, the matatu system and the BRT system should work together 
here as well. If the BRT system is truly intended to decrease congestion its success is built upon 
the need for riders to utilize it and decrease their use of other forms of road transportation, such 
as matatus and personal vehicles. However, residents will be less likely to transfer if they have to 
purchase two separate tickets, one for the matatu and one for the BRT, for each trip. Therefore, 
policies for joint transfer tickets or discounts on BRT tickets from passengers who arrived via 
matatu should be explored. It is vital that both systems work together to ensure that transfers are 
affordable, safe and easy.  
Another important factor to be considered when examining the design of the 
transportation system as a whole is that of equity and the income-based mobility gap that 
presently exists in Nairobi. Planning processes and designs must include equity as a significant 
factor of consideration for the design of new the system. Lower income residents overall have 
less access to the CBD via transit then their middle-income peers. This transportation problem 
could be part of what keeps them in a cycle of poverty as they may not have access to as many 
opportunities for employment, education and advancement.  
To be successful, this type of effort would include not only the addition of much needed 
connections to lower income areas via the BRT system, but also an effort to increase matatu 
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access to lower income areas over 10km from the CBD where perhaps BRT expansion is not the 
most cost-productive idea. This is especially critical concerning residents of the city’s furthest 
neighborhoods, like Ngundu. Found in the Nairobi’s most eastern corner, this low-income 
neighborhood is not slated to be accessible by the future planned BRT, has little to no matatu 
access, and has residential area’s which cannot access the CBD, secondary, or tertiary 
destinations within 90 minutes on any of the study’s three transit networks.  
Issues related to density and congestion, as well as opportunities related to economic 
development, seem to have been the core motivations behind the planned corridor and station 
locations for the current future planned BRT system. For equity concerns to be considered on the 
same level, the provision of transportation in Nairobi would need to be viewed at as a service 
provided by the government for the people, as opposed to transportation as a method of profit. 
This goes against the way that transportation has been designed and deployed in Nairobi, 
especially concerning the matatu industry, which is in most ways an entrepreneurial effort. 
Presently, some of the lowest income neighborhoods are sometimes not served by the 
matatu network because they cannot afford to pay the fares. As an entrepreneurial industry where 
the matatu drivers and owners planning the routes are most concerned with making a profit, what 
drives the provision of transportation service is demand and supply, and there is no demand if the 
people cannot pay the fare. Therefore, it makes sense logically that when considering access to 
the CBD, that middle-income residents have the highest access, high-income residents have the 
second highest access, and that low-income residents have the least access across all of the 
networks.  
To successfully implement a BRT based mass rapid transit system in Nairobi which 
works to lower the income-based accessibility gaps, a few key things should be done. First of all, 
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public outreach should be implemented to engage with these residents and truly understand their 
needs. Secondly, a citywide policy should be enacted to incentivize the provisions of service 
from the matatu sector to lower income areas. Lastly, a system of subsidized transit fares should 
be provided to people make below a certain income. 
In parallel the new system should also provide transit connections to wealthier areas as a 
lesser priority than their low-income counterparts. High income residents are overall less served 
than their middle-income counterparts, although the exact level of service does change some 
when different networks and time intervals are considered. As high-income residents are much 
more likely to own cars or otherwise have access to vehicular transportation, providing access 
for these residents could help deal with Nairobi’s congestion by removing some of these drivers 
from the roadways, especially considering that high-income residents are more likely to be 
formally employed in a job that requires commuting at peak time to and from the CBD.  
Providing service to high-income residents could also help ensure the financial 
sustainability of the project as these users would be able to pay un-subsidized fares. Additionally, 
service to high-income areas could also help lower income residents working in service jobs in 
these areas. However, as much of this employment would fit into the informal sector exact data 
on the impacts of this type of trip is unknown and would require more research. 
Lastly, it is important that in the design of a comprehensive transportation system for 
Nairobi it be understood that BRT is not the only option and that other types of mass rapid transit 
infrastructures are explored during the planning process. Several analyzed planning documents 
actually recommend heavy or light rail for key corridors in the city, and doubts have been raised 
about the ability of a BRT system to provide enough capacity to meet the growing demand. 
Additionally, although BRT has been touted as being flexible system, an interesting similarity 
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with one of the key positive arguments for the matatu network, this flexibility also allows for 
poor implementation as there is a growing concern that what will be implemented in Nairobi will 
not actually meet the standards of a true BRT and instead will be an express bus service sold and 
branded as BRT.   
 
4.4: Conclusions 
It is understood that the overall intentions behind the development of a BRT based mass 
rapid transit system in Nairobi is to improve the city’s passenger transportation options by 
providing its residents with an efficient, affordable, equitable and sustainable transportation 
system. Presently, the lack of a well-designed and reliable transportation system in Nairobi 
causes significant problems as the city is often brought to a halt due to very high levels of traffic 
congestion at both on- and off-peak hours. Nairobi’s current roadway conditions are generally 
unsafe, and commute times can be incredibly long. Although, the existing matatu system serves 
the transportation needs of many people in Nairobi, its network of paratransit mini-buses are 
often regarded as being unsafe and unreliable. An overhaul of its transportation system is 
something that Nairobi desperately needs, but the 2012 Work Bank Kenya: National Urban 
Transport Improvement Project which was intended to provide significant funding for the 
development of a series of transportation related improvements throughout Kenya, including the 
development of a BRT based mass rapid transportation system for Nairobi, was halted on 
December 28, 2018 following six years of unsatisfactory performance and with only 21% of its 
funds dispersed (The World Bank, 2018). 
Concerning the development of the existing transportation planning efforts analyzed in 
this study, it appears that political process and institutional structures have had a significant 
effect on the resultant transportation planning documents. Both the devolution of government 
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implemented by the 2010 Kenyan Constitution, and the formation of NaMATA to work directly 
under the federal government to manage the planning efforts for a new mass rapid transit system, 
have had a substantial impact on the structure of governance for transportation projects in 
Nairobi. Although the 2010 Constitution gave the rights to Nairobi’s roadways to the NCC, 
NaMATAs role working directly under the GoK as opposed to under or within the NCC, has 
created a new conflict over what institution owns, controls, and is responsible for transportation 
on Nairobi’s roadways, and in turn any future BRT based mass rapid transit system.  
Additionally, a significant lack of coordination exists between local and national 
agencies, as well as the international funding organization and consultants with whom they 
collaborate. This has led to many fiscally wasteful results. For example, there is a large amount 
of repetition across Nairobi’s transportation planning documents analyzed as part of this study 
(see Figure 3-A). A plethora of transit goals and plans, many of which have included planning 
efforts for a BRT system, have continually been developed and remained unrealized. These 
projects have been developed by a variety of consultants through a series of local and national 
agencies who are dependent on an array of local and international funding sources. All parties, 
with the exception of the consultant, usually bring with them their own desires and ideas, leading 
to a collection of somewhat repetitive plans which are often similar, but always often contradict 
each other.  
Overall, planning efforts, and their recommendations concerning Nairobi’s future, did not 
appear to significantly consider the existing transportation system, reliant heavily on the matatu 
paratransit network. Although it is assumed that transportation planning efforts likely took the 
locations of Matatu routes and stops into consideration when developing key areas and corridors 
of demand, these documents lack a clear understanding of the role which matatus currently play 
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in the City of Nairobi, or the ways in which they should be designed into any potential BRT 
based mass rapid transit system as feeder routes. Understanding how, where and when matatus 
will drop-off and pick-up passengers for the BRT system is critical to its success. Transfers in 
between the BRT and matatu routes should be designed into the operations, scheduling, stop 
locations, station designs and fare policies of both systems.  
Instead, there has been an overall lack adequate coordination and collaboration with the 
matatu industry throughout the BRT planning process. It appears that the planning for the needed 
coordination between the planned future BRT system and the matatu system will once again fall 
onto the matatu industry, who have been assuming the role of transportation planners for the 
system in the absence of a formalized transportation planning since the matatu system began 
(Klopp & Mitullah, 2016). With the introduction of BRT, careful and formalized planning to 
facilitate the location of matatu stops, designed matatu drop-off and pick-up areas surrounding 
BRT stations, thoughtful transfer fare policies, and integrated scheduling is essential to the safety 
and ease of passenger’s transfers between systems.  
In addition to the central conclusions and answers to the originally posed research 
questions, this study has made major methodological contributions to the scholarship concerning 
transportation planning in Nairobi through its complex multi-part GIS analysis. This network 
analysis was first of its kind for Nairobi – knitting together a variety of unconventional data 
sources in order to provide a clear comparison of commute times to the CBD, secondary, and 
tertiary destinations, across income levels by different transit networks. Through this, a clear 
picture of Nairobi’s present and potential future transit systems was able to be analyzed and 
understood. This type of methodology has the potential to help urban and transportation planners 
in Nairobi make sound data-based decisions about the city’s transportation future which can have 
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a significant impact on the lives of many people. Efforts to better utilize existing data resources 
as well as to create and share openly new data developed throughout the planning process, 
should be a designated part of Nairobi’s transportation planning efforts in the future. 
In Nairobi, BRT has been advertised as an extraordinary low-cost solution that will not 
only resolve the cities congestion issues, but help the city attract more global capital and 
economic development. This is not unique, but is actually part of a broader trend where BRT has 
become the preferred transit mode for international development organizations, including the 
World Bank, in cities with significant paratransit systems. However, as is evident by the study of 
Nairobi’s transportation planning efforts concerning the implementation of BRT, these systems 
are not without their own issues, and they may not be the best solution. Because of this growing 
global trend, transportation planners and policy makers around the world could benefit from a 
deeper understanding of what has been happening concerning the planned future BRT system in 
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